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Notes
ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v HICKS: HAS THE SUPREME COURT
TURNED ITS BACK ON TITLE VII BY REJECTING
"PRETEXT-ONLY?"
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination in the workplace, whether subtle or blatant, is a bias
that has plagued many respected institutions throughout this nation.' In
1964, Congress addressed this problem by passing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 2 a federal civil rights statute that combats
discriminatory employment practices based on an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.3 The language of Title VII "makes plain
the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered . . . stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens."
4
1. See, e.g., James Conway, Mr. Packwood's Neighborhood - No Shame in the Senate,
WASH. PoST, Jan. 16, 1994, at C1 (discussing Oregon Senator Robert Packwood's
unwelcomed sexual advances and harassment of several female staff members and
aides); Lynn Duke, Charges Ignite Lobbying Groups - Court Nominee, His Accuser and
Senate Process Come Under Fire, WASH. PosT, Oct. 8, 1991, at A9 (discussing allega-
tions of sexual harassment/discrimination by Anita Hill against then Supreme
Court Justice-nominee Clarence Thomas while both were employed for Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission); Dupont, Black Employees Settle Discrimination
Suit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 15, 1993, at A20 (discussing $14 million settlement
of 155 black, former-employees' claims against Fortune 500 company DuPont Co.,
involving racially discriminatory seniority system); Lisa Petrillo, Thesis Charges Sex
Bias Is Still Strong in Navy, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 26, 1992, at B3 (stating sexual
discrimination is deeply-rooted in very structure of Navy, evidenced by 1991
Tailhook Scandal that was source of sexual assault and harassment allegations).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (discussing
purposes of Title VII with regard to employment practices that have disparate im-
pact on minority employees (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
(1971))).
During extended debate over Title VII in the Senate, Senator Byrd of West
Virginia explained:
The avowed purpose of [T] itle VII of the bill is to eliminate, by formal ...
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment on account of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. The title would provide for a con-
(123)
1
Rappaport: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned It
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Although the purpose of Title VII may be evident, the means of inter-
preting Title VII to further this purpose have recently come into question.
The controversy concerns the proper interpretation of the evidentiary
framework the United States Supreme Court developed for use in Title VII
claims.5 In 1973, the Supreme Court set forth an evidentiary framework
that allowed employees to prove intentional discrimination without direct
evidence of discriminatory animus. 6 Subsequently, the Court refined this
burden of proof scheme and required that an employer satisfy merely a
burden of production of evidence on the issue of non-discriminatory justi-
fications for an employment decision. 7 Under this framework, a Title VII
plaintiff could establish discriminatory intent circumstantially, by proving
that an employer's reason for a challenged employment decision was
pretextual. 8
This framework had been in place for two decades without any major
conflicts, when the federal courts began to diverge in their interpretations
of this scheme.9 Commentators have referred to these conflicting inter-
pretations as "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus." 10 The interpretation of
this burden of proof scheme was important as courts that employed the
"pretext-plus" approach placed a significantly higher evidentiary burden
gressionally declared national policy of nondiscrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin in matters of promotion and
employment.
110 CONG. REc. 13,169 (1964).
5. See Hannah A. Furnish, Fornalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme
Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUs. REL.
L.J. 353, 356-58 (1984) (discussing importance of pretext issue in Title VII claims);
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Sum-
mary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rv. 203, 220 n.64 (1993)
(stating that pretext-plus rule increases misuse of summary judgment and usurps
trier of fact's role in discrimination cases). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 57 (1991) (discussing competing views sur-
rounding issue of burdens of proof in employment discrimination cases); Marina
C. Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive In Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114 (1988) (discussing both proce-
dural and substantive aspects of indirectly proving discriminatory motive under
Title VII)..
6. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05. For further discussion of the McDon-
nell Douglas evidentiary framework, see infra notes 19-46 and accompanying text.
7. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56
(1981) (clarifying McDonnell Douglas tripartite evidentiary framework and reversing
lower court decision that improperly placed burden of persuasion on defendant).
8. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
9. For a discussion of the varying interpretations utilized by the federal courts,
see infra notes 47-97 and accompanying text.
10. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 67 (using terms "pretext-only" and "pretext-
plus" to describe conflicting interpretations). For a further discussion of the "pre-
text-only" approach, see infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of the "pretext-plus" approach, see infra notes 73-97 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 39- p. 123
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on the plaintiff than .'pretext-only" courts and made it considerably more
difficult for the plaintiff to prove discrimination."1
Recently, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of the proper evi-
dentiary burdens for a Title VII race discrimination claim in St. May's
Honor Center v. 'Hicks.12 In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a trier of
fact's rejection of an employer's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for making a challenged employment decision does not entitle an
employee to a judgment as a matter of law unless the employee has of-
fered persuasive evidence that the employer acted with discriminatory ani-
mus.13 Hicks is significant because it represents one in a series of rulings
by 'the Supreme Court that makes it more difficult for employees who have
suffered discrimination to win civil rights lawsuits. 14
In section II, this Note discusses the evidentiary framework for Title
VII suits and cases that are illustrative of the "pretext-only" or "pretext-
plus" approaches. 15 Section III of this Note analyzes the Hicks Court's ra-
tionale for rejecting the "pretext-only" approach. 16 This section also dis-
cusses the rationale of the dissent, which advocated the "pretext-only"
approach. 17 Finally, this Note suggests that Congress take legislative ac-
tion to ensure that courts interpret the evidentiary framework of a discrim-
ination suit in a manner consistent with the purposes of Title VII.18
11. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 91 (discussing amount and quality of "plus"
evidence required in "pretext-plus" courts). Under the "pretext-plus" interpreta-
tion, reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case will not appease
"pretext-plus" courts, even when theSupreme Court has given the indication that
pretext could be shown with this evidence in tandem with effective cross-examina-
tion of a defendant. Id. (citing Grisby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 596
(lth Cir. 1987), Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979) and
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981)). A
higher burden on the plaintiff results from the requirement of additional evidence
by the pretext-plus courts. Id. at 99. Viable forms of such proof include direct,
comparative and statistical evidence. Id.
12. 113 S. Ct. 2742.(1993). For a discussion of the forms of discrimination
affected by this decision and the rationale for its encompassing effects, see infra
note 24.
13. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
14. Joseph D. Vass, Job Discrimination Suits Still Provable, STAR TRIB., July 31,
1993, at 15A (arguing that although job discrimination suits are still provable,
Hicks decision makes that proof much more difficult). For a further discussion of
the Supreme Court rulings that make winning, a. civil rights claim more difficult,
see infra note 225..
15. For a discussion of the evidentiary framework for Title VII suits and the
two interpretations of this framework, see infra notes 19-97 and accompanying
text. I . I
16. For a discussion of the majority's reasoning in Hicks, see infra notes 120-70
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the dissent's reasoning in Hicks, see infra notes 171-206
and accompanying text. , . I .
18. For a discussion of aproposal for legislative action, see infra notes 225-26
and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. McDonnell Douglas Evidentiay Framework
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,19 one of the first Title VII cases to
reach the Supreme Court, the Court addressed the order and allocation of
proof in a private, non-class action suit challenging employment discrimi-
nation. 20 In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, Percy Green, a McDonnell
Douglas mechanic and black civil rights activist, was fired by McDonnell
Douglas as the result of a general reduction in workforce. 2 1 Upon Green's
re-application to the mechanic position, McDonnell Douglas allegedly re-
fused to rehire Green because of his protest activities following his dis-
charge.22  Green, however, alleged that the true reason behind
McDonnell Douglas' refusal to rehire was his race and his civil rights
activities. 23
The McDonnell Douglas Court set forth a tripartite evidentiary frame-
work for evaluating claims of discrimination under Title VII.24 Under this
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
20. Id. at 800.
21. Id. at 794. Green vehemently protested McDonnell Douglas' decision and
alleged that his discharge and the general hiring practices at McDonnell Douglas
were racially motivated. Id. Green's protests included participation in a "stall-in,"
where Green drove his car to a McDonnell Douglas access road and blocked the
morning entrance of its employees. Id. at 794-95. This activity resulted in Green
pleading guilty to a charge of obstructing traffic. Id. at 795. In addition, while it is
uncertain whether Green actively participated in a "lock-in," he admitted to having
knowledge of a "lock-in" against McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 795 & n.3. The "lock-
in" occurred when civil rights activitists placed a chain and lock on the front door
of McDonnell Douglas' building to prevent its employees from leaving. Id. at 795.
Following these protest activities, McDonnell Douglas publicly advertised for quali-
fied mechanics. Id. at 796.
22. Id.
23. Id. Green filed a complaint against McDonnell Douglas with the EEOC.
Id.
24. Id. at 802-05. This framework was later affirmed and refined in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
The McDonnell Douglas framework applies only to disparate treatment claims.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-88 (1989) (distinguishing be-
tween "pretext" and "mixed motive" cases, court stated that McDonnell Douglas ap-
plies to disparate treatment claims involving pretext); Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., 988
F.2d 457, 468 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993); Ezold v. Wolf,
Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). Disparate treatment involves an employer treating certain
persons less favorably than others simply because of their race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
"Proof of discriminatory' motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. Disparate treatment
may be actionable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (section 1981), and the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (section 1983), in addition to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993) (using McDonnell Douglas framework in Title VII and section 1983 claims);
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1993) (using McDonnell Doug-
las framework in ADEA claim); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723 (8th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1992); McCoy v.WGN Continental Broad-
casting, Co., 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ.,
941 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991) (using McDonnell Douglas framework in section 1981
claim), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992); Holder v. Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir.
1989) (using McDonnell Douglas framework in section 1981 and section 1983
claims); Williams v. Williams Elecs. Inc., 856 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988) (using Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework in claim arising under section 1981); Chipollini v. Spen-
cer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.) (using McDonnell Douglas framework under
ADEA), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727
F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (using McDonnell Douglas framework in claim arising
under section 1981). Therefore, because courts apply Title VII principles to other
substantive areas, the Hicks decision's impact is probably not limited to race dis-
crimination under Title VII. The decision reaches discrimination under Title VII,
age discrimination under the ADEA and race discrimination under section 1981
and section 1983.
There are, however, several circumstances in which the McDonnell Douglas
framework is not appropriate. The framework is not applicable in a number of
situations in which intentional discrimination is not at issue. See Diane L. Hoadley,
Note, Title VII and Mixed Motives - Too Little Too Late? Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 167, 173-74 (1990) (discussing different applicable eviden-
tiary frameworks when intent is not at issue).
First, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply to claims involving
so-called "mixed motive" discrimination. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247. See gen-
erally Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Mo-
tives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REv. 17 (1991) (discussing
Price Waterhouse and legal standards for dealing with mixed motive discrimination
cases). A mixed motive case is one in which the evidence indicates the employer
has both permissible and impermissible criteria for the employment decision.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247. In Price Waterhouse, the respondent, Hopkins,
was a female senior manager for a professional accounting partnership, Price
Waterhouse. Id. at 231. In 1982, Hopkins was considered for partnership; how-
ever, no decision to offer or deny Hopkins partnership was made that year. Id.
Instead, her candidacy was postponed for reconsideration in the following year.
Id. When Price Waterhouse later denied Hopkins partnership, she sued Price
Waterhouse alleging Price Waterhouse had engaged in gender discrimination
against her, in violation of Title VII. Id. at 231-32. A plurality of the Court deter-
mined that the employer was required to carry the burden of persuasion "by prov-
ing that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [an
impermissible reason] to play such a [motivaing] role." Id. at 244-45. The em-
ployer's burden in mixed motive cases, as opposed to pretext cases in which the
burden of production applies under McDonnell Douglas, is of persuasion because
mixed motive cases by their very nature will always contain direct evidence of in-
tentional discriminatory animus. Id. at 244-47. When mixed-motives are involved,
"it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was the true reason"
because the court has already determined that both legitimate and illegitimate rea-
sons motivated the employer. Id. at 247. Further, Justice O'Connor, in her con-
currence, stated that when there is direct evidence of intentional discriminatory
animus, it is logical to place a heavier burden on the employer.. Id. at 271
(O'Connor,J., concurring). The purpose of the McDonnellDouglas framework is to
compensate for the "fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard
to come by." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor further stated that she did
"not think that the employer [was] entitled to the same presumption of good-faith
where there [was] direct evidence that it ha[d] placed substantial reliance on factors
whose consideration [was] forbidden by Title VII." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Therefore, the employer must do more than articulate a lawful reason for the chal-
5
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framework, the plaintiff-employee has the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.25 This is the first stage of the tripartite
framework. 26 To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove: (1)
that the plaintiff is part of a protected class; (2) that the plaintiff applied
for the position at issue; (3) that the plaintiff was qualified for the posi-
tion; (4) that the employer rejected the plaintiff; and (5) that the em-
ployer kept the position open and continued to seek applicants from
persons with plaintiff's qualifications.
2 7
lenged employment decision. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). For further discus-
sion on the policy reasons taken into consideration when determining burdens,
see infra note 32.
Second, the McDonnell Douglas burden structure does not apply in cases where
an employer asserts an affirmative defense of a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) in response to charges of discrimination. See International Union v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 449 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (discussing framework in claim
involving BFOQ). When an employer asserts a BFOQ defense, the employer is in
effect admitting that he or she used impermissible criteria in the decision, but
asserting that its use was justified in the particular instance. EEOC v. Mercy Health
Ctr., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 162 (W.D. Okla. 1982). The employer's
admission is direct evidence of intentional discriminatory animus. See Johnson Con-
trols, 499 U.S. at 200. Therefore, the use of the McDonnell-Douglas framework,
which functions to create inferences of discriminatory intent, is not needed. See
Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769, 777 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (stating that "[tihe necessity for the McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof,
and in particular the prima facie case with its resulting inferences, is absent in
situations involving a [BFOQJ"), affid, 779 F.2d 50 (1985).
Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reaffirmed the traditional view that dis-
crimination in the form of disparate impact is another exception to the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (Supp. V 1993). The disparate im-
pact doctrine prohibits employment practices that are facially nondiscriminatory
but ultimately have a discriminatory impact on a protected class, when those prac-
tices cannot be justified by business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 -(1971). In a disparate impact claim, there is no need to prove intentional
discriminatory animus on the part of the employer. Id. Unlike situations where
intent to discriminate is at issue, in disparate impact claims Congress decided to
place the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove its legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons for the challenged policy or decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (1).
25. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
27. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Members of the protected class in-
clude those persons protected under the applicable statute. See id. For example,
under Title VII, the protected classes include those effected by employment deci-
sions based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17. The ADEA protects persons over the age of forty from employment de-
cisions based on age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
In Burdine, the Supreme Court noted that the prima facie case requirements
can vary because the prima facie case "is not inflexible as '[t]he facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases,'" depending on the type of discrimination and the differing
factual situations. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)). For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Mesnick v. General Electric Co. stated that a prima
facie ADEA case involving a discharge requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that "(i)
the plaintiff was over the age of forty, (ii) his [or her] work was sufficient to meet
his (or her] employer's legitimate expectations, (iii) his [or her] employer took
6
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Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of pro-
duction then "shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision." 28 This is
the second stage of the tripartite framework. 29 If the employer cannot
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision,
the employee prevails.3 0 If, however, the employer offers legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons, the plaintiff is given an opportunity to prove that
the employer's proffered reasons were in fact a pretext for impermissible
discrimination. 3 ' While the burden of production lies with the defendant
adverse action against him [or her], and (iv) the employer sought a replacement
with roughly equivalent job qualifications." 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992). In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Bennun v. Rutgers State University stated that the prima facie
case in a Title VII discrimination claim involving promotion requires a showing
that the employee "is a member of a [protected class,] that [the employee] applied
for, is qualified for and was rejected for the position sought, and that non-mem-
bers of the protected class were treated more favorably." 941 F.2d 154, 170 (3d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992). Finally, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Williams v. Williams Electronics, Inc. stated that a
prima facie case involving a dismissal based on a "reduction in force" requires a
showing that the employee was a member of the protected class, that the em-
ployee's job performance met his or her employer's legitimate expectations, that
the employee was fired, and that other employees, not members of the protected
class, were treated more favorably, 856 F.2d 920, 922-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing
Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 1988)); see BARBARA LINDEMANN
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1317-18 nn.80-91 (2d
ed. 1983) (discussing various applications of McDonnell Douglas framework and not-
ing that significance of McDonnell Douglas framework "lies not in its specification of
the precise elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case, but in its
creation of a method by which plaintiffs may carry their burden of offering suffi-
cient evidence to create an inference that the defendant's actions were
discriminatory"). -
28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This burden
is one of production, not persuasion; therefore the employer "need not persuade
the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254. The purpose of this burden is to "frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext." Id. at 255-56. To satisfy the burden of production, "the defendant must
clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the
plaintiff's rejection." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
29. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
30. Id. at 254. The Court noted that the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas establishes a rebuttable presumption, of unlawful discrimination. Id. Fur-
ther, the Court stated that "(i]f the trier of fact believes that plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumotion,'the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." Id. For a
discussion of the rationale behind the rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrim-
ination established by the prima facie case, see infra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text.
31. Burdine, 450 U.S at 253. Once the employer has met its burden of pro-
-duction, "the factual inquiry proceeds to a.new level of specificity." Id. at 255.
1994] NOTE
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(employer) at the second stage of a Title VII action, the burden of persua-
sion rests with the plaintiff (employee) at all times.3 2
One of the main concerns that pervades employment discrimination
litigation is the unavailability of evidence regarding discriminatory ani-
mus.33 Even plaintiffs with a bona fide claim may find his or her case
impossible to prove if he or she had to produce direct evidence of discrim-
inatory animus. Because discrimination in the employment setting is
often invidious 34 and employers are becoming increasingly sophisticated
about employment law, direct evidence of intentional discrimination is
rare. 5 The McDonnell Douglas framework accommodates this scarcity of
direct evidence by allowing the factfinder to infer discriminatory intent
from the circumstances. 3 6 Thus, under the shifting burdens of proof
32. Id. at 254, 256. "Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus
serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by. presenting a legiti-
mate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity ....
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion." Id. at 255-56.
Commentators have suggested that courts examine several factors including
policy, convenience, fairness and probability in allocating burdens of production
and persuasion. McGinley, supra note 5, at 215 n.46 (citing Candace S. Kovacic-
Fleisher, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as
Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 615, 622-23 (1990)). Under the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine framework, "patterns of proof were designed to ease the evidentiary bur-
dens on employment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate enough to
have access to direct evidence of intentional discrimination." Grisby v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (1lth Cir. 1987). Similarly, when evaluating other
areas of law,
[p] olicy issues include factors such as burdening the plaintiff because the
person seeks to change the status quo or burdening the defendant when
certain defenses are disfavored or unusual. Included under convenience
and fairness issues are factors such as who has knowledge and access to informa-
tion and whether the burden follows the natural order of storytelling.
McGinley, supra note 5, at 215 n.46 (emphasis added) (quoting Candace S.
Kovacic-Fleisher, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Se-
mantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 615, 622-23 (1990)); see Robert Belton, Bur-
dens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1217-18 (1981) (discussing policy considerations courts
should consider when determining how burdens of proof should be allocated be-
tween parties).
33. See David Y. Loh, Note, A Critical Analysis of Academic Tenure Decisions: The
Disparate Treatment Model Under Title VII Examined, 12 B.C. THID WORLD L.J. 389,
390 (1992) (discussing how Title VII plaintiffs' greatest difficulty is establishing
discriminatory intent).
34. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 716 (1983) (stating that "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to
the employer's mental processes"); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G. R.R., 760 F.2d
633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[e]mployers are rarely so cooperative as to
include a notation in the personnel file" stating that employee was fired for dis-
criminatory reason).
35. See McGinley, supra note 5, at 214 (stating that "[a]s defendants become
increasingly sophisticated about the law, these admissions [constituting direct evi-
dence] occur very rarely") (footnote omitted).
36. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). An
employer who intentionally discriminates is not likely to leave "a 'smoking gun' ...
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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scheme articulated in McDonnell Douglas, establishing a prima facie case
creates a rebuttable presumption that differences in treatment were the
result of unlawful motives.3 7 Nevertheless, the employer can rebut the
presumption of discriminatory intent, and thereby meet its burden of pro-
duction, by clearly setting forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its employment decision through the introduction of admissible evi-
dence.3 8 By doing so, the employer raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.3 9
The third stage of the McDonnell Douglas three-part scheme is the
"pretext stage." 40 At this stage, the plaintiff must prove that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant were not the true
reasons for the challenged employment decision.4 1 This stage raises an
issue of sufficiency of evidence - namely, what evidence will be sufficient
to prove "pretext for discrimination. ''4 2 Again, the frequent lack of avail-
attesting to a discriminatory intent." Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d
Cir. 1991) (citing Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir.
1990) and Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988)).
A victim of discrimination can seldom prove his or her claim via direct evidence
and usually must rely on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 533 (citing Ramsuer v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1989) and Hollander v.
American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Therefore, "[t]he shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are
designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence.'" Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121 (quoting Loeb v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)); see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an
inference of discrimination only because [the court] presume [s] these acts, if other-
wise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of imper-
missible factors."); see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (noting that in some instances intent can be inferred from "mere fact of
differences in treatment").
37. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54
(1981). The requirements of the prima facie case eliminate claims based on the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons - an employer's rejection of the plain-
tiff-job candidate for lack of requisite qualifications and absence of vacancy. Id. at
254; see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44 (stating most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for rejection of applicant).
38. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. Proving a prima facie case establishes a presump-
tion that "is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination." Id. at 255 n.8. See generally Mack A. Player,
The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49
Mo. L. REv. 17 (1984) (discussing and analyzing requirements of defendant's bur-
den of production in intermediate stage of McDonnell Douglas framework).
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
41. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
42. See id. at 256 (stating that burden on plaintiff to demonstrate pretext
"merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [he or] she has
been the victim of intentional discrimination").
In addition, when deciding a summary judgment motion, a court does not
evaluate the credibility of the parties to discover the true reason for the employ-
ment decision. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 64 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Instead, the court simply decides whether there is
1994] ,NOTE
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able direct evidence of discriminatory motive remains a prime concern for
the courts when dealing with discrimination in the employment setting.
43
The Supreme Court, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,4 4
addressed the sufficiency issue, succinctly stating that a plaintiff may suc-
ceed either "directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."45 This statement appeared to
set forth the plaintiff's evidentiary burden to obtain a judgment as a mat-
ter of law. However, the pretext stage has undergone much turmoil as a
decisive minority of federal courts have parted from this 'pretext-only"
interpretation.
46
"sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the. stated justifica-
tions for rejecting the plaintiff were 'pretextual.'" See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
43. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). For a
further discussion of the unavailability of direct-evidence in an employment dis-
crimination case, see supra note 36.
44. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, the Supreme Court faced a Title VII
dispute predicated on gender discrimination. Id. at 251. The Court, while reaf-
firming the McDonnell Douglas framework, confirmed that the defendant bears only
the burden of production in the second stage of the framework. Id. at 256-59.
45. Id. at 256 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, reaffirmed -the language of Burdine, which per-
mits the plaintiff to succeed With indirect proof. 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). In
Aikens, a black employee of the United States Postal Service filed suit under Title
VII alleging that the ,Service discriminated against him because of his race by refus-
ing to promote him. Id. at 713. In an opinion by then Associate Justice Rehnquist,
the Court stated that when the defendant proffers legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for an employment decision, the presumption of unlawful discrimination
created by the prima facie evidence "drops from the case." Id. at 715 (quoting
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981)). The
Court further stated that the factfinder must then decide the ultimate issue of
whether the "defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." Id.
(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
There has been debate concerning the appropriate interpretation of the Aik-
ens decision. See generally Szteinbok, Note, supra note 5 (discussing efficacy of indi-
rect proof in disparate treatment claims after Aikens). The ambiguity centers
around the issue of the sufficiency of indirect evidence in proving pretext. See id.
at 1119 (stating that "the Supreme Court cast doubt upon the conclusiveness of
proving the defendant's explanation to be false"). The majority opinion in Aikens
did not address the probative value or sufficiency of indirect evidence in proving
pretext. Id. In fact, Rehnquist made no explicit reference to the evidentiary suffi-
ciency issue at all. Id. However, Justice Blackmun, who concurred in a separate
opinion, stated his interpretation of this issue. Aikems, 460 U.S. at 717-18 (Black-
mun,J., concurring). Blackmun's concurrence stressed the interpretation that the
plaintiff may prevail through the use of indirect evidence by proving the em-
ployer's proffered reasons false. Id. at 718 (Blackmun,J., concurring)., The confu-
sion has resulted over whether the majority's omission constitutes an implicit
acceptance or rejection of the concurrence's interpretation. See Szteinbok, Note,
supra note 5, at 1119 (stating that Blackmun concurrence in Aikens created "con-
siderable confusion ... [in] the relationship between proof that the [employer's]
reason is spurious and proof of discriminatory intent").
46. For a further discussion of cases rejecting the "pretext-only" approach, see
infra note 73.'
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B. The "Pretext-Only" Approach
Until June 1993, a majority of lower federal courts followed the "pre-
text-only" approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas.47 This approach enti-
tled the plaintiff tojudgment as a matter of law when, in the third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff persuaded the factfinder
that the defendant's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employment decision was not the true reason.4 8 Courts
47. See, e.g., Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.) (stat-
ing that, under ADEA, "Burdine clearly does not support a pretext-plus approach"),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1992); Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 795 (8th Cir.
1992) (allowing plaintiff in sex discrimination case to rebut employer's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for employment decision solely by indirect or circum-
stantial evidence); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting, Co., 957 F.2d 368,
372 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that ADEA plaintiff must "show by a preponderance
of the evidence either (1) that the employer was more likely motivated by a dis-
criminatory reason, or (2) that the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of
credence" to show pretext (quotation omitted)); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.) (stating that to prove pretext, Title VII plaintiff
need not prove discriminatory intent but may simply prove defendant's reasons
were untrue), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 228 (1991); Grohs v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods.,
859 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that ADEA plaintiff proves pretext by
"demonstrat[ing] that (1) the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) the proffered
reasons did not actually motivate his [or her] discharge, or (3) that they were insuf-
ficient to motivate discharge" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1036
(1989); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (not-
ing that, under ERISA, "Burdine made it plain that.., a plaintiff may prevail upon
a showing that the employer's given legitimate reason ... was not the true reason
for the unfavorable employment decision"); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d
715, 726 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that if Title VII plaintiff presents "enough evi-
dence for ajury to find that the asserted reasons for the tenure denial were not the
actual reasons, then the jury may infer that the employer actually was motivated in
its decision by race; plaintiff is not required to provide independent, direct evi-
dence of racial discrimination"); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893,
899 (3d Cir.) (holding that if ADEA plaintiff persuades "the trier of fact that it is
more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then
the employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evi-
dence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of
discriminatory intent"), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Tye v. Board of Educ.
of PolarisJoint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20. (6th Cir.) (holding that
under Title VII McDonnell Douglas framework, "the plaintiff may indirectly prove
intentional discrimination by showing that the defendants' justifications are un-
true"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); ,King v. Palmer,.778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (holding in sexual discrimination claim that "Burdine makes it abso-
lutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrim-
ination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal should prevail, even if he or
she has offered no direct evidence of discrimination"); Thornbrough v. Columbus
& G. R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that ADEA plaintiff "is not
required to prove that the [defendant] was.motivated by bad reasons; he [or she]
need only persuade the factfinder the [defendant's] purported good reasons were
untrue").
For a further discussion of cases adopting the "pretext-only" approach, see
Lanctot, supra note 5, at 71-72 & nn.46-53.
48. See, e.g., Valentec Kisco, 964 F.2d at 728 ("We reject [defendant]'s conten-
tion that [plaintiff] had to both discredit [defendant's] stated reason for firing him
and prove that age was a determining factor in [defendant]'s decision."); Palmer,
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following this approach made no further inquiry into the true reason for
the act once the plaintiff proved pretext.49 Instead, these courts inferred
discriminatory motive from the employer's lies. 50 Under this approach,
the plaintiff bore the ultimate burden of persuasion that the employer's
proffered reason for the challenged employment decision was false.
5 1
778 F.2d at 881 (stating that "a district court may not require direct evidence of
intentional discrimination as opposed to circumstantial evidence thereof"). For an
example of the application of this rule, see Tye v. Board of Education of Polaris
Joint Vocational School District. 811 F.2d at 320. In Tye, a female guidance coun-
selor whose contract was not renewed because of a reduction in force brought a
Title VII claim. Id. 'at 316. The employer offered several legitimate reasons to
justify its decision to renew a male counselor's contract instead of Tye's. Id. at 318.
The defendant submitted a list of 10 reasons for the non-renewal of Tye's contract.
Id. Of those 10, four reasons concretely justified the staff reductions, but not why
Tye was singled out. Id. The other six were accepted "to meet the intermediate
burden of articulating legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons why 'someone else
was preferred."' Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). These six reasons proffered by Tye's superintendent for
Tye's non-renewal were: (1) a desire for multiple certification of staff, (2) a con-
cern for staff diversity and complement, (3) Tye's poor demeanor and attitude, (4)
Tye's interaction with other faculty, (5) program changes at the school, and (6)
the superintendent's subjective feelings and impressions. Id. at 318-19. Tye
proved that the offered explanations were pretextual by showing that the district
superintendent was not personally familiar with her or her work. Id. at 320. The
district superintendent did not interview Tye or examine Tye's personnel file. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that where the em-
ployer makes no attempt to gather information, and "gives evasive ... testimony
regarding the choice [between a male and female counselor], he [or she] runs the
risk that a Title VII plaintiff will be able to prove pretext. Ms. Tye achieved pre-
cisely that by disproving all of the defendants' proffered reasons." Id. Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit entered judgment for the plaintiff-counselor. Id.
49. See, e.g., Adams, 962 F.2d at 796 (holding that "defendants' proffered rea-
son for the adverse action against plaintiff was a pretext for intentional discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex," thus concluding in plaintiff's favor under McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine analysis); McCoy, 957 F.2d at 372 (stating that "a plaintiff may sim-
ply attack the credibility of the employer's proffered reason for termination" to
succeed in plaintiff's claim).
50. See, e.g., Adams, 962 F.2d at 796 (holding in favor of plaintiff once pretext
is proven); McCoy, 957 F.2d at 372 (same); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856
F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that "employer's submission of a discred-
ited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence ... that
such unlawful discrimination actually occurred"); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.) (holding that "under the McDonnell
Douglas test, a showing that a proffered justification is pretextual is itself equivalent
to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated"), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1087 (1984).
51. See, e.g., McCoy, 957 F.2d at 372 (stating that "[a] showing that a proffered
justification is pretextual may itself be equivalent to a finding that the employer
intentionally discriminated" (quoting Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d
13, 18 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Costen v. Plitt Theatres,
Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988))); Dister, 859 F.2d at 1113 (holding that "[wle
reaffirm this view today and . . . [find] that a plaintiff may prevail at trial if, in
addition to establishing a prima facie case, he [or she] persuades a reasonablejury
that the reason advanced for his [or her] discharge... was unworthy of credence");
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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In Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation Inc.,52 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit illustrated the application of the "pretext-
only" rule. Haglofwas an age discrimination case. 53 The plaintiff in Haglof
was.a physical therapy aide for Northwest, a nursing home. 54 Haglof was
fifty-one years old when Northwest terminated her employment and per-
mitted the company president's twenty-one year-old daughter to fill the
aide position. 5 5 Northwest claimed it fired Haglof because the nursing
home was restructuring its workforce, which involved eliminating Haglof's
position and replacing the position with one requiring greater creden-
tials. 56 Northwest stated that it had intended to immediately restructure,
but that the candidate chosen to replace Haglof had become unavaila-
ble.57 Consequently, the president's daughter, who lacked the requisite
higher credentials, temporarily replaced Haglof. 58 According to North-
west, it took one month to find another candidate with the requisite cre-
dentials. 59 Haglof did not believe Northwest's proffered reason for
discharging her and pointed out that the restructuring did not occur until
after she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) claiming'age discrimination.6° In addition, Haglof em-
phasized Northwest's inability to produce any evidence proving the
existence of the candidate it had purportedly originally chosen.
6 1
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held
that Haglof had produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination and that Northwest had satisfied its burden by
offering the restructuring of the workforce as its legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for Haglof's termination. 62 The court then addressed
Tye, 811 F.2d at 319 (stating that "the ultimate question of intentional discrimina-
tion can only be answered by ascertaining the truth of the proffered reasons").
52. 910 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1990).
53. Id. at 493.
54. Id. at 493 n.2.
55. Id. at 493.
56. Id. The restructuring eliminated the aide positions and changed Haglof's
specific position into a full-time physical therapy assistant position. Id. at 493 n.2.
Physical assistants were required to have a two-year degree and license, while aides
needed only a high school diploma. Id. In spite of the difference in educational
requirements, Haglof contended that the change in positions had no practical
consequences. Id. Haglof claimed that although she did not possess the required
educational credentials, she was capable of performing the required duties for
Northwest. Id. She claimed that although assistants could write patient charts and
aides could not, it was common practice for aides to write-up the patient charts for
the assistants to sign. Id.
57. Id. at 493.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Northwest was unable to give the prior candidate's name or produce a
copy of the candidate's employment application. Id.
62. Id. Specifically, the district court, in an unpublished opinion, found that:
(1) Haglof was in the protected age bracket, (2) Haglof had performed her job
1994] NOTE.
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whether, in light of Northwest's proffered reason for the discharge, Haglof
ultimately produced sufficient evidence for ajury to find that age discrimi-
nation had been a "substantial factor in her dismissal." 63 The district
court decided that Haglof's evidence was insufficient and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, Northwest. 64
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.65 First, the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court
had misconstrued the principles governing the inference of discriminatory
intent.66 Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Burdine, the
court held that a plaintiff need not offer direct evidence of discriminatory
animus to discredit an employer's proffered reason for making a chal-
lenged employment decision.6 7 Second, the Eighth Circuit found that
Haglof introduced evidence beyond that necessary to establish a prima
facie case, and that this evidence was sufficient for "the jury to find that
the restructuring was a sham." 68 The court decided there were two possi-
ble reasons for the employment action - age discrimination or nepo-
tism. 69 In light of Haglof's evidence of pretext regarding Northwest's
proffered reasons, the court decided that summary judgment was inappro-
priate and the determination of motive was for the jury, not the court, to
decide. 70 Haglof illustrates the "pretext-only" approach to the McDonnell
Douglas framework. "Pretext-only" courts presumed that if the defendant
satisfactorily, (3) Haglof was terminated and (4) Haglof was replaced, albeit tem-
porarily, with a younger person providing similar skill or service. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 495.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 494. This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement
in Burdine that a plaintiff may succeed "indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256.(1981).
The Haglof court further stated that in certain circumstances, the evidence
comprising the plaintiff's prima facie case may rebut the employer's proffered rea-
son for the employment decision. Haglof 910 F.2d at 494. Under this scenario,
the plaintiff does not have to produce any additional evidence beyond the evi-
dence that establishes the prima facie case. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 .n.10 (1981)). Senior District Judge Stuart
concurred with the above analysis, stating that if the evidence the plaintiff in-
troduces to establish a prirma facie case tends to show that the employer's proffered
reasons are not credible, such a showing could render summary judgment for the
employer ina ppropriate. Id. at 495 (Stuart, J., concurring).
68. Haglof 910 F.2d at 495. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff's
evidence showed that Northwest did not restructure its work force until plaintiff
filed the EEOC complaint. Id. at 494-95. Further, the evidence that showed that
the restructuring had "no practical effect" on the nursing home workforce, clearly
would have allowed the jury to infer a discriminatory motive. Id.,
69. Id. at 495. Nepotism is arguably an illegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
that would not cause liability under the ADEA. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 136-40
(discussing probative value of illegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason).
70. Haglof 910 F.2d at 495.
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had a lawful motive, the defendant would advance this true nondiscrimi-
natory reason. 7 1 These courts reasoned that falsity of an employer's justifi-
cation is "strong evidence that the defendant is concealing a
discriminatory motive." 72
C. The "Pretext-Plus" Approach
In spite of the seemingly well-grounded history of the "pretext-only"
approach, a minority of federal courts embraced an alternative approach
known as "pretext-plus."73 The "pretext-pius" rule required a plaintiff to
71. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 81; see McGinley,.supra note 5, at 218 ("The ra-
tionale for the plaintiff's victory if the'defendant cannot articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the hiring decision is that employers normally act
rationally unless motivated by an illegal prejudicial motive." (footnote omitted)
(citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
72. Lanctot, supra note 5, at 81. This rationale is well-supported in Burdine,
which allows the plaintiff to succeed'via both direct and indirect means. Texas
Dep't'of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see Duffy v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1401 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissent-
ing on other grounds) ("Our intuitive understanding of bigotry supports an infer-
ence of pretext from virtually any defect in an employer's explanation of a
decision to disfavor a member of a Title VII protected class."), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1087 (1984); see also Szteinbok, Note, supra note 5, at 1120 (stating that "common
experience with employment discrimination shows that such a decision, unless le-
gitimately, explained, was more likely than not based on impermissible considera-
tions"). Courts that adhered to the pretext-only approach inferred "discrimination
from disproof of the defendant's proffered explanation for two reasons. First, the
defendant's falsehood casts a shadow of doubt over the credibility of the evidence
it has introduced.... Second, an inference of discrimination is warranted because
the evidence cannot support a finding of some permissible motive" for the employ-
ment action. Szteinbok, Note, supra note 5, at 1121.
73. See Samuels v. Raytheon C6rp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991). In Samu-
els the United States Court of AppeaIs for the First Circuit noted that:
[e]ven assuming the original prima facie case plus the evidence of pretext
suffices to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, this does not
automatically entitle [a Title VII] plaintiff 'totjudgment. Provided a con-
trary inference . . .might also reasonably be drawn from the evidence,
such a showing only creates an issue of material fact[,] . :. and, if discrimi-
nation is subsequently found, will-support that finding.
Id.; see Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that ADEA "plaintiff-employee must adduce minimally sufficient evidence of pre-
text and discriminatory animus"); EEOC v. Flasher, 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir.
1992) (noting in Title VII termination claim based on national origin that "Burdine
makes clear that the plaintiff must show not merely that the proffered reasons are
pretextual but that they are a 'pretext for discrimination'." (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450.U.S. 248,. 253 (1981))); Lawrence v. Northrop
Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that in wrongful discharge claim
under ADEA, "[i] t is notenough... to cast doubt upon the employer'sjustification
.... '[riather, the evidence as a whole . : . must be sufficient for a reasonable
factfinder to infer that. the employer's decision was motivated by age animus"'
(quoting Connell v. Bank of. Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S..Ct. 2828 (1991))); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 283
(6th Cir. 1991) (noting that in Title VII race discrimination claim "[t]he plaintiff
still must prove the purpose of the pretext was to hide an impermissible reason for
discharge"), cert. denied, 112 §. Ct. 1497 (1992); Ramos v. Roche Prods., Inc., 936
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not only persuade the trier of fact that the employer's proffered reasons
for the employment decision were false, but also required the plaintiff to
provide some additional evidence of discriminatory animus to persuade
the factfinder that the employer's true reason for the decision was in fact
discriminatory.74 The evidentiary requisites for the plaintiff under this ap-
proach are much more rigorous than that of "pretext-only," especially in
light of the plaintiff's difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of
discrimination.
75
F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.) (noting that Title VII "plaintiff's burden of proving pretext
may not be met 'simply by refuting defendant[']s articulated reason"' (quoting
White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984))),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 379 (1991); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that under ADEA "the [employee] must elucidate
specific facts which would enable ajury to find that the reason given was not only a
sham, but a sham intended to cover up the employer's real motive: age discrimina-
tion"); Holder v. Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that in
claims arising under Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983, "[w]e agree ... that
[s] howing that the employer [lied] is not necessarily the same as showing pretextfor
discrimination... [i] t is easy to confuse pretext for discrimination with pretext in
the more common sense (meaning any fabricated explanation for an action)");
Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 848 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[Plaintiff]'s
proffered evidence does little but dispute the objective correctness of [defendant] 's
decision .... [E]ven assuming it could be shown that [defendant] was wrong to
blame him, this would be insufficient to prove pretext or discriminatory intent
[under ADEA]."); Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Union, 843
F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that under Title VII, "once the defendant artic-
ulates a non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff has the burden of showing not
that the proffered reason was fabricated, but that it 'was not the true reason for the
employment decision'" (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981))); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Dev.
Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.) (noting in Title VII action that "a demon-
stration that the employer has offered a spurious explanation is strong evidence of
discriminatory intent, but it does not compel such an inference as a matter of
law"), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717
F.2d 525, 529 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("[A] simple finding that the defendant did not truly
rely on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied
instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability.").
For a further discussion of cases adopting the "pretext-plus" approach, see
Lanctot, supra note 5 at 81-83 & nn.92-96.
74. See, e.g., Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1118 ("[P]laintiff-employee cannot avert
summary judgment if the record is devoid of direct and circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory animus on the part of the employer."); Galbraith, 944 F.2d at 283
(noting that particularly in Title VII race discrimination claims "proving that an
employer's proffered reason for discharging an employee is pretext does not estab-
lish that it is a pretext for discrimination"); Holder, 867 F.2d at 828 (noting that in
claims arising under Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983, "a finding that the
reasons proffered by defendants were, in some general sense, unworthy of
credence does not of itself entitle plaintiff to prevail ... [w]ithout proof of racial
discrimination, any remedy of ours would be without warrant in the law" (citations
omitted)).
75. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 91 (stating that "a plaintiff in a 'pretext-plus'
jurisdiction may be hard-pressed to generate additional evidence that will satisfy
these courts"); see also Loh, Note, supra note 33, at 415 (stating that under pretext-
plus approach, direct proof of illegal motive is "extremely difficult to obtain be-
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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1994] NOTE
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had been
perhaps the strongest proponent of the "pretext-plus" rule.76 The First
Circuit's resolve was well illustrated in Mesnick v. General Electric C. 77 In
Mesnich, an age discrimination case, the plaintiff worked for RCA Auto-
mated Systems Division at RCA's Burlington facility for fourteen years
prior to his discharge. 78 In 1987, General Electric Company (GE), which
had recently purchased RCA, named a new director of finance, who be-
came Mesnick's immediate supervisor.79 Mesnick's first performance eval-
uation under new management was largely negative.80 This evaluation was
the basis for a very rocky relationship between Mesnick and the director of
finance.8 1 In December 1987, GE named a forty-two year-old outside can-
didate to oversee the Contracts Department at both Burlington and an-
other GE facility.8 2 In the process, Mesnick was essentially demoted and
cause of the added requirement of proving that this motive did in fact adversely
affect the tenure review process").
76. See, e.g., Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117 (implementing "pretext-plus" ap-
proach); Lawrence, 980 F.2d at 69-70 (same); Ramos v. Roche Prods., Inc., 936 F.2d
43, 48 (lst Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 379 (1991). But see Villanueva v.
Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 127-28 (1st Cir.) (contradicting itself, court simul-
taneously advocated First Circuit's use of "pretext-plus" yet declared that plaintiff's
burden may be satisfied without additional evidence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181
(1991).
77. 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991).
78. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 55 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1291, 1292
(D. Mass.), affd, 950 F.2d 816 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992). Mesnick
had eleven years experience with the United States Air Force prior to being hired
in 1974 by RCA as a Senior Contracts Administrator. Id. at 1293. In June 1977,
Mesnick was promoted to Grade 52 Contracts Manager, and inJune 1982, he was
promoted to a Grade 53 Contracts Manager. Id. In this last position, he assumed
the duties of the overall Contracts Manager, supervising other managers and sub-
ordinates. Id. Mesnick remained in this position until December 1987. Id.
79. Id. at 1293. Once GE completed the purchase of RCA in 1986, GE began
to phase in a new management team. Id.
80. Id. This poor evaluation caused Mesnick's merit raise to be reduced by
50%. Id. Prior to the managerial change, Mesnick had received mixed evalua-
tions. Id. Former supervisors had a very high opinion of his "technical skills,
knowledge of his job, and knowledge of the government acquisition process." Id.
According to these supervisors, Mesnick's major weaknesses were difficultly in in-
teracting with other employees and occasionally engaging in inappropriate behav-
ior. Id. Such behavior included drinking at lunch, projecting a poor image with
customers, and crude and offensive behavior. Id.
At Mesnick's performance evaluation, the new director of finance discussed a
plan for corporate reorganization with Mesnick. Id. at 1293-94. This plan called
for the reorganization of the Contracts Department and the creation of a new
position that would oversee both the Burlington facility, where Mesnick worked,
and another GE facility. Id.
81. Id. at 1294-95. From.January 1987 to September 1988, Mesnick wrote
memos to the director of finance's supervisors and other managers, complaining
about the director of finance's lack of managerial skills. Id.
82. Id. at 1294.
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now reported to the new manager.8 3 From that point forward, Mesnick's
tirade against his supervisors escalated until he was terminated on
"grounds of insubordination and failure to work harmoniously with
others."8 4 Mesnick promptly filed charges with the EEOC alleging a viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).85
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found that Mesnick's evidence of age discrimination was insufficient to
survive summary judgment for the defendant.8 6 At the district court level,
Mesnick had averred that GE violated the ADEA by cutting his expected
salary increases, preventing him from applying for the managerial position
eventually filled by a younger person, demoting him and replacing him
with a younger person, harassing him and eventually terminating him.8 7
While the district court acknowledged that Mesnick had satisfied the first
two stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework,8 8 it reasoned that to avoid
summary judgment the plaintiff not only had the burden of proving that
GE's articulated reasons were pretextual, but also of producing additional
evidence showing the reasons were a pretext for age discrimination.8 9
83. Id. Although the director of finance discussed the new managerial posi-
tion with Mesnick, GE never posted the position as an official vacancy. Id. at 1294
& n.2. Consequently, Mesnick never had the opportunity to apply for the position.
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 821. When GE hired the new manager, Mesnick was essen-
tially demoted. Mesnick, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1294. He was assigned
to a different office and lacked any supervisory power. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 821.
His salary and benefits, however, remained unchanged. Id.
84. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822. Mesnick received a performance evaluation six
months after the new manager was hired. "Mesnick, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1295. The new manager's evaluation was very similar to past evaluations, prais-
ing his technical skills but giving Mesnick a "marginally acceptable" rating overall.
Id. As a result, Mesnick failed to receive a merit raise that year. Id. In response,
Mesnick circulated a billet-doux, which rebutted his recent unfavorable evaluation
and chastised his superiors. Id.
85. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822. Mesnick had also previously filed a complaint
with the EEOC for GE's failure to promote him and its decision to hire a younger
man to be manager. Id. at 821. The EEOC dismissed both of these complaints as
meritless. Id. at 822.
86. Mesnick, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1296.
87. Id. at 1292.
88. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825. A prima facie age discrimination case requires a
showing that (1) plaintiff was over age 40, (2) plaintiff's work met the employer's
legitimate expectations, (3) plaintiff's employer took adverse action against him or
her and (4) plaintiff's employer sought a replacement with roughly equivalent job
credentials, thus revealing a continued need for the same skills and services. Id. at
823. GE conceded that Mesnick may have been able to establish a prima facie
case. Mesnick, 55 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1298. However, GE stated that its
actions were "wholly justified by [Mesnick's] continuing poor performance and in-
subordination." Id. This proffered ieas6n fulfills GE's burden of production in
the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine evidentiary framework. Mesnick,
950 F.2d at 825.
89. Mesnick, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1296 (quoting Olivera v. Nestle
Puerto Rico, Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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NOTE
Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the lower court's judgment. 90 The First Circuit, adopting the
"pretext-plus" rationale, stated that it was not enough for a plaintiff to
"merely impugn the veracity of the employer's justification," but that the
plaintiff must also provide evidence that the employer's real motive was
discriminatory. 9 1 The First Circuit recognized that Mesnick introduced
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to the veracity of the
employer's proffered reasons.9 2 However, because there was no evidence
in the record to indicate that the true reason for GE's action was discrimi-
natory, Mesnick could not avoid summary judgment.93
Courts that adopted the "pretext-plus" approach did so to protect a
defendant-employer from deriving a benefit by setting forth an untrue rea-
son for its employment decision.9 4 In these circumstances, proof that the
90. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 820.
91. Id. at 824; see Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)
("[P]laintiff must be given the opportunity to introduce evidence that the [em-
ployer's] proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination."). The Mes-
nick court did not require a "smoking gun" or direct evidence of the
discrimination to fulfill this evidentiary burden. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824. Admissi-
ble evidence showing a truly discriminatory motive includes the use of younger
replacements, statistical evidence that displays unequal treatment and the inci-
dence of disparate treatment in the workplace. Id. See generally Lanctot, supra note
5, at 91-100 (noting that although many courts say they do not require direct evi-
dence of discriminatory animus, survey of "pretext-plus" decisions shows that many
courts are unwilling to allow most accessible forms of circumstantial evidence to
suffice in proving discriminatory motive).
92. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825. At the district court level, Mesnick presented a
great deal of evidence in an attempt to illustrate his "professional competence and
ability to work well with others." Id. at 825-26.
93. Id. at 825. Mesnick presented two pieces of evidence purporting to show
GE's discriminatory motive. Id. at 826. The court found both pieces of evidence
to be unpersuasive. Id. First was a comment by the director of finance, on the
occasion of a younger employee's departure, that the director was "sad to lose the
youth of the work force." Id. The court dismissed this statement as nondiscrimina-
tory, reasoning that, in this instance, lauding the young did not implicitly depreci-
ate the old. Id.; see Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400-02 (7th Cir. 1990)
(construing supervisor's comment that "[iut is refreshing to work with a younger
man with ... a wonderful outlook on life and on his job" as not being probative
evidence of discriminatory animus).
The second piece of evidence was a list of potential recruits for the new man-
ager position, which was furnished to GE by an outside research firm. Mesnick, 950
F.2d at 826. This list included the names and ages of the candidates. Id. The
court dismissed this evidence because Mesnick offered nothing to prove that GE
requested such data or had knowledge that such data would be included in the list.
Id. The court concluded that the "intentions of a third party may not be attributed
to an employer without some rational basis for attribution." Id.; see Medina-Munoz
v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that biases of
parties other than those of decision-maker are not usually sufficient as probative
evidence of discrimination).
94. See EEOC v. Flasher, 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th'Cir. 1992) ("A pretextual
reason may be advanced to conceal a wide range of possible motivations." (citing
Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Dev. Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987))).
1994]
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defendant's proffered reason is pretextual does not prove the ultimate
question of discriminatory animus.9 5 In recognition of this fact, the "pre-
text-plus" courts required plaintiffs to prove actual discriminatory intent.to
meet their ultimate burden of persuasion. 96 "Pretext-plus" courts accept
nothing less than proof of discriminatory intent and require the plaintiff
to produce additional evidence beyond the evidence that proves an em-
ployer's proffered reasons false. 97
Il1. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HicKS
A. Facts
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,98 the Supreme Court considered
the issue of the proper evidentiary framework for a Title VII race discrimi-
nation claim. 99 Melvin Hicks, the plaintiff, sued his employer, St. Mary's
The employer may also feel pressured, for some reason, not to articulate the
actual reason for the employment action. One commentator has stated:
If an employer actually makes a decision based on the fact that the appli-
cant is left-handed, or green-eyed .'. . regardless of the irrationality of the
reason, the employer will not be engaging in discrimination proscribed
by the statute.... In the face of a prima facie case creating an inference
of ... discrimination, a defendant is obligated to articulate legitimate
reasons from which proper motivation can be inferred. Some reasons
(such as left-handedness or gleen-eyedness) are so weak that they will not
allow a reasonable inference to be drawn that these reasons .... actually
motivated the employer.
Mack A. Player, Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Infer-
ences as a Talisman for Analysis" 36 MERCER L. 11Ev. 855, 877-78 (1985).
95. See White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.) (stating that under
"pretext-plus," plaintiff "can not meet his burden of proving 'pretext' simply by
refuting or questioning the defendant's articulated reason"), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
933 (1984).
96. See, e.g., Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321 ("Merely finding that people have been
treated differently stops short of the crucial question: why people have been
treated differently."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9
(1st Cir. 1990) ("To [carry the, burden of persuasion), an ADEA plaintiff must do
more than simply refute or cast doubt on the company's rationale for the adverse
action. The plaintiff must also show a discriminatory animus based on age."); see
also Lanctot, supra note 5, at 86-87 (discussing requisites and goal of proving "pre-
text for discrimination" under "pretext-plus" approach).
97. See, e.g., Fasher, 986 F.2d at 1321 (affirming judgment for employer on
Title VII termination claim based on national origin, and stating that "even a find-
ing that the reason ... was pretextual, does not compel [a conclusion of liability,]
unless it is shown to be a pretext for discrimination against a protected class");
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that
ADEA "plaintiff must do more than cast doubt on the employer's justification for
the challenged action; there mustbe a sufficient showing that discriminatory ani-
mus motivated the action").
98. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
99. Id. at 2746. As previously discussed, the holding of Hicks applies not only
to Title VII claims, but to other forms of employment discrimination covered
under different statutes. See, e.g., Goldman, 985 F.2d 1113 (applying Title VII prin-
ciples to ADEA claim); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1989)
(applying Title VII evidentiary principals to claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981
20
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Honor Center, a halfway house, under Tide VII alleging St. Mary's de-
moted and subsequently terminated him because of his race. 100 Hicks
had a satisfactory employment record with consistently satisfactory ratings
for six years.10 1 Three months prior to Hicks' eventual termination, a new
supervisor, who was white, continually disciplined Hicks for procedural vi-
olations. 10 2 All but one of these violations attributed to Hicks were, in
fact, direct violations committed by Hicks' subordinates. 10 3
In June 1984, St. Mary's fired Hicks.10 4 Hicks subsequently filed a suit
alleging racial discrimination. 10 5 After Hicks successfully proved a prima
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a discussion of the forms of discrimination affected by
this decision and the rationale for its encompassing effects, see supra note 24.
100. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Hicks alleged a
violation of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, in addition to the Title VII
violation. Id. Section 1983, which is just one provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, permits an action for a deprivation of rights that constitutes racial discrimi-
nation under state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states that any State, Terri-
tory or District of Columbia "subjects, any citizen . . .to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the party injured". Id. The elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 are identical to those of Title VII when they are both alleged in a race
discrimination suit. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1253.
101. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246. Hicks began working for St. Mary's in Au-
gust 1978 as a correctional officer and was later promoted to shift commander in
February 1980. Id. Hicks did not commit any procedural violations that necessi-
tated documentation until March 1984. Id.
102. Id. In January 1984, in response to substandard operations, St. Mary's
replaced its Chief of Custody, Gilbert Greenlee, a black man who was Hicks' supe-
rior, withJohn Powell, a white man. Id. In addition, St. Mary's made other person-
nel changes that resulted in the demotion or termination of several black
employees and the employment of several white employees. Id. at 1246 n.2. St.
Mary's, however, initially offered the Chief of Custody position to a black male,
who turned it down. Id.
103. Id. at 1246-47. St. Mary's disciplined Hicks on several occasions for viola-
tions committed by his subordinates. Id. These violations included documented
instances that: (1) the front door officer left his post, (2) the control center officer
left his position to tend to the front door, (3) one of Hicks' correctional officers
was absent and (4) the lights were off on the first floor of the facility. Id. at 1246.
Hicks received a letter of reprimand for failing to adequately investigate a brawl
between two inmates. Id. In addition, St. Mary's later demoted Hicks as a result of
his subordinate's failure to log in usage of the facility vehicle. Id. St. Mary's di-
rectly cited Hicks in only one violation. Id. Hick's supervisor, Powell, documented
a "threat" Hicks made against Powell in a heated argument. Id. Hicks complained
that Powell constantly badgered him. Id.
104. Id. at 1248. The superintendent of the facility, who was white, fired
Hicks after a meeting of a four-person disciplinary board composed of two blacks
and two whites. Id. John Powell, Hicks' supervisor, was a member of the board.
Id. at 1247 & n.7. The board recommended suspending Hicks. Id. at 1247. How-
ever, the superintendent disagreed with and disregarded the board's recommen-
dation, deciding on his own, to terminate Hicks. Id. There was evidence that
Powell had voted to terminate Hicks because of their confrontation and Hicks'
personal "threats." Id.
105. Id. at 1245. Hicks successfully proved a prima facie case of race discrimi-
nation. Id. at 1249. First, he was black, and therefore a member of a protected
19941 NOTE
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facie case of racial discrimination, St. Mary's proffered its allegedly legiti-
mate and nondiscriminatory reason for firing Hicks.10 6 The reasons St.
Mary's gave for this decision were the number and severity of violations by
the plaintiff.10 7 However, at trial, Hicks successfully proved that: (1) he
was the only person disciplined for violations actually committed by his
subordinates and (2) co-workers had committed more serious violations
that were either "disregarded or treated much more leniently."108
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
entered judgment in favor. of St. Mary's. 10 9 The district court found that
although Hicks had demonstrated that St. Mary's proffered reasons were
pretextual, the "plaintiff ha[d] not.., proven by direct evidence or infer-
ence that his unfair treatment was motivated by his race."1 10 The district
court made several observations in coming to this conclusion, including
the fact that there were two blacks on St. Mary's disciplinary board, the
number of blacks employed at St. Mary's stayed constant and Hicks' black
subordinates that were perpetrators of the violations were not disci-
plined."' Hicks appealed the district court's decision to the Court of Ap-
class. Id. Second, Hicks proved he met the applicable job qualifications of a shift
commander. Id. At the time of Hicks' termination, he held the shift commander
position for approximately four years. Id. In addition, St. Mary's consistently rated
Hicks as competent and until 1984, had not disciplined Hicks for misconduct. Id.
Third, Hicks was the victim of an adverse employment decision when he was de-
moted from shift commander to correctional officer in April 1984 and fired in
June 1984. Id. at 1250. Fourth, after Hicks' demotion, his former shift com-
mander position remained open and was later filled by a white male. Id.
106. Id. at 1250.
107. Id. St. Mary's offered these reasons to meet its burden of proving a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Hicks. Id. At St. Mary's, violations
of internal policy, which lead to breaches of security in a correctional institution,
are grounds for disciplining the responsible employee. Id. The excessive accumu-
lation of these procedural violations over a short period of time was purportedly a
factor in St. Mary's decision to.terminate Hicks' employment. Id.
108. Id. at 1250-51. An example of disparity in discipline occurred when a
white correctional officer who was acting as shift commander negligently allowed
an inmate to escape. Id. at 1248. St. Mary's merely sent the officer a. letter of
reprimand. Id. In another incident, a white shift commander left the doors to the
main power room open that were supposed to be locked at all times. Id. St. Mary's
did not discipline this employee for the violation. Id. Finally, an incident that
involved a correctional officer who became "indignant and cursed [Hicks] with
highly profane language" resulted in no discipline. Id. Powell contended and the
hearing board concluded the employee was simply venting his frustration. Id.
Although Hicks had committed several violations of the institutional rules,
Hicks offered evidence to show that St. Mary's treated Hicks more harshly than his
peers who committed equally severe or more severe infractions. 'Id. at 1251. By
making this showing, Hicks successfully proved that the employer's proffered rea-
sons were unworthy of credence. Id.
109. Id. at 1252.
110. Id.
111. Id.
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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peals for the-Eighth Circuit.1 2 The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding
that once Hicks had discredited the stated reasons for his demotions and
discharge, he was not required to provide any additional evidence of racial
discrimination, but instead was entitled to prevail as a matter of law.113 In
other words, the Eight Circuit applied the "pretext-only" approach to the
claim.11 4
Finally, Hicks reached the Supreme Court.11 5 The Supreme Court
subsequently. reversed the Eighth Circuit's judgment.' 16 The Supreme
Court in Hicks rejected the "pretext-only" approach and held that Hicks
was not entitled to judgment as a matter.of law. 117 Although the trier of
fact had rejected St. Mary's proffered legitimate,, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for Hicks' termination, the Court noted that Hicks failed to offer any
admissible evidence proving that the true reason for his termination was
discriminatory.' 18 This, in the Court's opinion, was fatal to Hicks' claim
for a judgment as a matter of law. 119
B. Narrative Analysis
The Court's opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, initially addressed this
area of "well-settled law"120 by inquiring whether Hicks proved that his
employer had in fact intentionally discriminated against him because of
his race. 12 ' The Court began its analysis in Hicks by utilizing a hypotheti-
112. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 2742 (1993).
113. Id. at 493. The Eighth Circuit, clearly endorsing the "pretext-only" ap-
proach, stated "if the plaintiff has proven... that all of the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons are not true reasons for the adverse employment action
- then the plaintiff has satisfied his or her ultimate burden of persuasion. No
additional proof of discrimination is required." Id. (citations omitted).
114. See id. (stating that "[iun this circuit; if the plaintiff has... proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that all of the defendant's proffered nondiscrimi-
natory reasons are not true reasons... ,then the plaintiff has satisfied his or her
ultimate burden of persuasion [and that n o additional proof of discrimination is
required").
115. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
116. Id. at 2756.
117.' Id.
'118. Id. at 2748.
119. See id. at 2750 (stating "nothing in law would permit us to substitute for
the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful dis-
crimination, the much different (and much' lesser) finding that the employer's
explanation of its action was not believable").
. 120. Id. The Court declared that this decision does not displace what the
dissent terms "settled precedent." Id.
121. Id. at 2746. The majority acknowledged that the goal of the McDonnell
Douglas framework was to "progressively sharpen the inquiry into the elusive fac-
tual question of intentional discrimination." Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)).
Accordingly, the Court ultimately held that the factfinder's disbelief of the
defendant's proffered reasons "may, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." Id. at 2749 (emphasis added).
1994] NOTE
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cal situation to demonstrate that applying the "pretext-only" approach
could often produce unfair results.' 2 2 The Court assumed a factual scena-
rio where forty percent of a company's work force were members of a
particular minority group, a group that comprised only ten percent of the
relevant employment market.' 23 One day, an applicant with the mini-
mum requisite qualifications, who is a member of the same minority group
described above, applies for an opening. 124 A personnel officer of that
same minority group rejects the applicant, yet continues his or her search
to fill the position.125 Subsequently, the rejected applicant files a claim
under Title VII for racial discrimination and, prior to trial, the personnel
officer, responsible for hiring, is fired.' 26 The Court demonstrated that
under the "pretext-only" approach, an employer who does not have access
to the thought processes of a supervisory employee who made an alleged
discriminatory employment decision can lose its case if the plaintiff can
prove the reasons the under-informed employer proffered were false. 127
This outcome could occur despite a disproportionately large make-up of
minority employees and the fact that an employee of the same minority
group made the questioned employment decision.' 28 Essentially, the
Court was troubled by the prospect of a jury finding the employer's rea-
sons incredible and a result in which the jury must assess damages regard-
less of whether it believes the employer was guilty of impermissible racial
discrimination. 129 ,
After illustrating the potential for unfair results under the "pretext-
only" approach, the Hicks Court then undertook the task of painstakingly
analyzing the language of Burdine to support its interpretation of the req-
uisites necessary to prove discrimination. 13 0 The first language in Burdine
that the Supreme Court tackled was the language stating that the plain-
tiff's burden in the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to prove
Thus, rejection of these reasons, "will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination." Id. (emphasis added). However, proof that the
defendant's proffered reason is pretextual does not entitle the plaintiff to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Id.
122. Id. at 2750-51.
123. Id. at 2750.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2750-51.
127. Id. at 2751. An employer could also lack access to a supervisory em-
ployee if that employee has retired, or changed employment.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The Court began its exposition on the explicit language of Burdine,
which reaffirmed the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. The Court stated that
there was no authority to impose liability "unless an appropriate factfinder deter-
mines -... that the employer has unlawfully discriminated . . .' But nothing in law would
permit us to substitute for the required finding that the employer's action was the
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different ... finding that the em-
ployer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reasons
were a "pretext for discrimination." 3 1 The Supreme Court stated in Hicks
that the plain meaning of this language is unmistakable - that a reason is
a "pretext for discrimination" only if the plaintiff proves both that em-
ployer's proffered reason was false and that the real reason behind the
challenged decision was discriminatory.13 2 The Court dismissed subse-
quent references in Burdine to proving or demonstrating "pretext" as be-
ing reasonably understood to be synonymous with "pretext for
discrimination."13 3
Scalia, in his majority opinion, also addressed the language in Burdine
that states that when the employer's burden of production has been met
"the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity." 134 The majority
interpreted this language to mean that the inquiry proceeds from the gen-
eralities of the prima facie case to the specifics incorporated in the "proofs
and rebuttals" of discriminatory intent that the parties have set forth.' 3 5
Further, the Court understood the purpose of placing the burden of pro-
duction on the defendant as serving "to frame the factual issue with suffi-
cient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext" to address the form, not the substance of the pro-
duction burden.13 6
The next passage considered by the Court was the Burdine language
stating that "[t] his burden [to prove pretext] now merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination." 3 7 According to the majority, the most rea-
131. Id. at 2751-52 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). For a further discussion of Burdine, see supra note 44
and accompanying text.
132. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
133. Id. at 2752 & n.6. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
807 (1973)).
134. Id. at 2752 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
255-56 (1981)). The "form" of the defendant's burden of production is the re-
quirement that the defendant "clearly set forth" its reasons. Id. (quoting Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)). According to
the majority, the requirement that the employer "clearly set forth" its reasons af-
fords the plaintiff a "full and fair" opportunity to rebut the employer's reasons. Id.
(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56
(1981)). In contrast, the dissent interpreted this passage as addressing the sub-
stance of the defendant's burden. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent
interpreted this passage to mean that the defendant'shapes the sole factual issue
- "whether the employer's reason is false." Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). For a fur-
ther discussion of the. dissenting opinion, see infra notes 171-206 and accompany-
ing text.
137. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
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sonable reading of this passage was that proving the employer's proffered
reasons were false was merely part of demonstrating that the true motiva-
tion behind the decision was discriminatory.138 The majority reasoned
that a reading to the contrary, that the ultimate burden is simply to pe r-
suade the trier of fact that the employer's reason is false, "would be a
merger in which the little fish swallows the big one."' 3 9
The Supreme Court concluded its review of Burdine by examining the
language that states that the plaintiff may succeed "either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explana-
tion is unworthy of credence." 140 The majority agreed with the dissent
that this language could have no other meaning than proving the falsity of
the defendant's proffered reasons will suffice to compel judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.14 1 However, Justice Scalia dismissed this language as dic-
tum, noting that the statement "contradict[ed] or render[ed] inexplicable"
much of the language of Burdine and subsequent case law in this area. 142
First, Justice Scalia reasoned that McDonnell Douglas, the case that set
forth the tripartite evidentiary framework, did not state that a plaintiff
merely needs to disprove the employer's asserted reason for'its challenged
employment decisiori.' 4 3 In fact, the Court noted that McDonnell Douglas
stated that the plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove that the "rea-
sons for his [or her] rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discrimi-
natory decision.' 44
Second, Justice Scalia further reasoned that this passage contradicts
the Burdine holding regarding who has the ultimate burden of proof. 145
The fact that a plaintiff may prevail simply by disproving the defendant's
proffered reason, with no further requirement that the plaintiff persuade
the factfinder that intentional discrimination took place, contravenes the
Burdine mandate that the burden of persuasion remains, with the plaintiff
at all times.' 4 6
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
141. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
142. Id. The Court coined the Burdine passage that allows success exclusively
through indirect evidence of discrimination a "problem" because the passage "con-
tradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements, both in Burdine itself
and in our later case-law. . . ." Id.
143. Id. at 2753. For a further discussion of McDonnell Douglas, see supra notes
1946 and accompanying text.
i44. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)).
145. Id. Scalia also stated that "It]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times With the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
146. Id.
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NOTE
Lastly, the majority contended that the statement contradicts the reli-
ance in Burdine on the "classic law of presumptions." 14 7 The Court's refer-
ence to the "classic law of presumptions" deals primarily with the theory
that a presumption only shifts the burden of production, but not that of
persuasion. 148 The majority said that the classic law of presumptions,
upon which Burdine relies, had been violated because the Burdine passage
at issue permitted a plaintiff to succeed without carrying the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion.' 49 In light of the above reasoning, the Court decided
to treat this "dictum" merely as an "inadvertence" because, according to
the majority, it contradicts both the Court's interpretation of Burdine and
the classic law of presumptions. 150
Upon concluding its analysis of the language of Burdine, the Court
stated that any confusion concerning its interpretation of Burdine was elim-
inated in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens.151 Accord-
ing to the majority, Aikens indisputably justified the Hicks majority's
reading of Burdine when the Aikens Court stated that "the ultimate ques-
147. Id.
148. Id. The Court relied in Burdine on classic law of presumptions and stated
Professors Thayer and Wigmore's theory that a presumption shifts "merely the bur-
den of production, but not the burden of persuasion, and then vanishe [s] upon the
introduction of evidence that would support a finding of the non-existence of the
presumed fact." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-
55 nn.7-8; J.B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw
336 (reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1898). The elimination of probative
value from a presumption was coined Thayer's "bursting bubble" theory of pre-
sumptions. 2 CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344, at
462 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). It should be noted that the test
under the "bursting bubble" theory is "one of sufficiency and not credibility." Mi-
guel A. Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatomy Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129, 1145 n.91 (1980). In other words, "[i]t is immaterial
that neither judge nor jury believes the testimony" but that there is "evidence in
the case from which a jury could reasonably find the non-existence of the pre-
sumed fact." JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
300-03 (1990) (citing EDMUND W. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34-36
(1962)). This classic law of evidence is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence
301. MCCORMIcK, supra, § 344, at 462. Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains through-
out the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EVID. 301.
149. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753 (citations omitted) (stating that Burdine lan-
guage at, issue "renders -inexplicable Burdine's explicit reliance, in describing the
shifting burdens of McDonnell Douglas, upon authorities setting forth the classic law
of presumptions").
150. See id. (stating that "dictum at issue must be regarded as an inadvertence,
to the extent that it describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a totally in-
dependent, rather' than an auxiliary, means of proving unlawful intent").
151. Id. For a further discussion of Aikens, see supra note 45.
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tion [is] discrimination vel non.' 5 2 This ultimate factual question of dis-
crimination is answered when the trier of fact decides "which party's
explanation of the employer's motivation it believes."' 5 3
In what seemed to be a direct response to the concerns of the dissent-
ers, the Court proceeded to examine the practical consequences of the
Hicks decision. Scalia was unpersuaded by the dissent's argument that the
Hicks decision gives defendant-employers an incentive to lie. 154 The ma-
jority acknowledged that the procedural device employed in Title VII
actions, namely the burden shifting of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework, may place a perjurer, initially, in a better position than a truth-
ful party who does not respond to the prima facie case. 155 However, the
majority noted that "the books are full of procedural rules" that have the
same effect.15 6 Furthermore, although a perjuring defendant may
"purchase... a chance at the factfinder," Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 and the expenses associated with affidavits made in bad faith under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) effectively deter perjury.15 7
152. Id. at 2753 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). Once the defendant satisfies its burden of production,
the factfinder must decide not "whether that evidence is credible, [but] whether
the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of the Title VII." Id. (quoting
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983)).
This is what is meant by "diScrimination vel non." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15.
153. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). The Court understood this to mean that
it is not sufficient "to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plain-
tiffs explanation of intentional discrimination." Id.
154. See id. (stating that "our rule in no way gives special favor to those em-
ployers whose evidence is disbelieved"). Justice Scalia stated that there is "no justi-
fication for assuming ... that those employers whose evidence is disbelieved are
perjurers and liars." Id. Scalia reasoned that often the defendant is a company
that must rely on the testimony of an employee, "often a relatively low-level em-
ployee - as to the central fact; and that central fact is not a physical occurrence,
but rather that employee's state of mind .... Title VII is not a cause of action for
perjury; we have other civil and criminal remedies for that." Id.
155. See id. at 2755 (stating that "under the McDonnell Douglas framework, per-
jury may purchase the defendant a chance at the factfinder - though there, as
here, it also carries substantial risks, see Rules 11 and 56(g)").
156. Id.
157. Id.; see Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Proce-
dure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L.
REv. 211, 289-96 & nn.362403 (1992) (discussing consequences of Rule 11 on em-
ployment discrimination actions).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party shall be signed .... If
a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the per-
son who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) provides in pertinent
part:
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Additionally, the Court rejected the contention that, under the "pre-
text-plus" approach, the plaintiff would be unfairly expected to refute
unarticulated reasons that a trier of fact could find "lurking in the record"
because "pretext-plus" fails to limit the inquiry to the employer's proffered
reasons. 5 8 The majority disagreed with this contention because, practi-
cally speaking, an employer's articulated reasons do not exist apart from
the record. 159 In light of this fact, the majority reasoned that unarticu-
lated reasons "lurking in the record" would not constitute a record be-
cause essentially all proffered reasons exist in the record, and are set forth
"through the introduction of admissible evidence. 16 0
Next, the Court proceeded to reject Hicks' argument that this deci-
sion is "ill-advised" in light of the recent availability of jury trials under
Title VII.' 6 1 Hicks argued that the availability ofjury trials in conjunction
with an evidentiary framework that required the factfinder be "plunged
standardless into a sea of defenses where every possible.., shred of indi-
rect and direct evidence might matter" would create chaos.1 6 2 In contrast,
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of
the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable
expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5 6 (g).
158. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2755.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
255 (1981)). Justice Scalia opined that "Title VII does not award damages against
employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment
action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employ-
ment action by reason of ... race." Id. at 2756. Further, just because an em-
ployer's reason is "unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived" does not
automatically establish racial discrimination. Id. The question of discrimination
remains a question for the trier of fact. Id.
161. Id. at 2756. Prior to 1991, the vast majority of authority held that be-
cause the relief available under Title VII was primarily equitable in nature, no right
to a jury trial existed for actions under Title VII. See, e.g., Teamsters Local No. 391
v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990) (assuming without explicitly deciding that "a
Title VII plaintiff has no right to ajury trial"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156,
164 (1981) (stating that "there is no right to trial by jury in cases arising under
Title VII"); see also HENRY H. PERRrrr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1991: A SPECIAL
REPORT § 3.2, at 61-62 (1992) (discussingjudicial debate onjury entitlement under
Title VII). In 1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 granted plaintiffs the right to
compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to the right to a jury trial when
plaintiffs seek compensatory damages or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(Supp. V 1993). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides in pertinent part: "(c) Jury
Trial. - If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under
this section -
(1) any party may demand a trial byjury...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. III
1991).
162. Brief for Respondent at 31, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742 (1993) (No. 92-602).
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the Court felt its decision honed the factfinder's ability to decide a dis-
crimination case.' 63 Further, Scalia countered Hicks' argument by stating
that a clear understanding of all the elements of proof becomes vital when
a jury must be instructed about the elements involved and when detailed
findings at the trial level will be unavailable upon review. 164 Therefore,
the majority, when compared to the dissent, came to a diametrically oppo-
site conclusion on the impact of jury trials, stating that its decision was
even more warranted in light of jury trial availability under Title VII. 65
Finally, the majority of the Court summarized its analysis by maintain-
ing that its interpretation reaffirms Aikens. 166 The Court reaffirmed its
position in Aikens by stating that although direct evidence is seldom avail-
able, the procedural framework for Title VII does not provide that courts
should treat the question of discrimination differently than any other ulti-
mate question of fact.1 6 7 Accordingly, the majority stated that it declined
to make the factfinder's inquiry in deciding the ultimate question of dis-
crimination more difficult by requiring the application of legal rules de-
vised to govern the allocation of burdens and order of presentation. 168
Therefore, the holding in Hicks is that a factfinder's disbelief of the
defendant's proffered reasons does not entitle an employee to ajudgment
as a matter of law.169 However, an employee can prevail, absent a showing
of direct evidence, if proof of pretext together with the prima facie case
persuades the finder of fact of the presence of the ultimate fact of discrim-
inatory animus.17 °
163. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2756 (discussing impact of Court's decision in
light of availability of jury trials under Title VII).
164. Id. (stating that "[c]larity regarding the requisite elements of proof be-
comes all the more important when a jury must be instructed concerning them,
and when detailed findings by the trial court will not be available upon review").
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711,716 (1983)).
168. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
252 (1981) and United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983)).
169. Id. at 2749.
170. Id. The factfinder's disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons "may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional dis-
crimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the
trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination .... Id. Fur-
ther, the majority concurred with the Court of Appeals that upon the rejection of
the defendant's proffered reasons, "no additional proof of discrimination is re-
quired." Id. (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)). No additional proof is required only when no evi-
dence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are offered by the defendant, or the
rejection of the proffered reasons and the evidence set forth to establish the prima
facie case is "enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination." Id. at 2748,
2749 n.4.
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Four members of the Court disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the evidentiary framework under Title VII.' 7 i The dissenting opin-
ion, written by Justice Souter, primarily contended that the majority has
taken the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework, a well-settled body of law,
and cast it aside.' 7 2 The dissent began its analysis by oudining the McDon-
nell Douglas framework and identifying the underlying function of the
framework - to reconcile competing employer-employee interests in a
discrimination action. 173
Justice Souter stated that the employer has an important interest in
being afforded the opportunity to come forward in the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework with a nondiscriminatory expla-
nation for its decision. 174 This opportunity is vital because the reasons the
prima facie case dismisses, namely, lack of an open position and requisite
qualifications, are not a complete set of nondiscriminatory reasons that
might explain the employment decision. 175 Therefore, the defendant has
his or her opportunity to dispel the presumption of unlawful discrimina-
tion that the prima facie case created, by proffering a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the challenged employment decision.
176
In contrast, Justice Souter opined that the employee's interest focuses
on not being burdened with having to eliminate all possible nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for a personnel decision or to produce direct evidence of
discriminatory intent.17 7 Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas approach al-
lowed 'an employee to enjoy the opportunity to succeed on an indirect
showing of discrimination by proving the employer's reasons false.
178
Justice Souter recognized that the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Doug-
las, reconciled these competing interests in a "very sensible way by requir-
ing the employer to 'articulate,' through the introduction of admissible
evidence, one or more 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [s]' for its ac-
171. Id. at 2756. The dissenters were Justices Souter, White, Blackmun and
Stevens. Id.
172. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting). The 'dissent, in its overview of the
McDonnell Douglas scheme, emphasized the role and importance of the prima facie
case. While in many areas of law, a prima facie case "only requires production of
enough evidence to raise an issue for the trier of fact, here it means that the plain-
tiff has actually established the elements of the prima facie case to the satisfaction
of the factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
By proving a prima facie case, Hicks "'eliminat(ed] the most,common nondiscrimi-
natory reasons' for demotion and firing: that he was unqualified for the position
or that the position was no longer available." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). For a
further discussion of McDonnell Douglas, see supra notes 19-46 and accompanying
text.
174. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (SouterJ., dissenting).
175. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
176. Id. (Souter, J. dissenting).
177. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
178. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
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tions."1 79 The dissent stressed the sensibility and fairness of the McDonnell
Douglas framework and accused the majority of abandoning the practical
function of the framework, which is to "sharpen the inquiry into the elu-
sive factual question of discrimination."18 0
Next, the dissent refuted the majority's approach to Burdine by pro-
ceeding to examine the explicit language of Burdine.'8 1 Justice Souter
contended that the Court took the shorthand phrase "pretext for discrimi-
nation" and attached requirements that were at odds with the require-
ments set forth in Burdine.18 2 These requirements are that "pretext" or
"pretext for discrimination" can simply constitute falsity of the employer's
proffered reasons.1 8 3 Further, the dissent attributed these word choices,
not to a crucial difference in meaning, but to sloppiness in summarizing
the Supreme Court's own opinion.' 8 4
The dissent also interpreted the purpose of the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, where the employer carries the burden of
production, to be an opportunity for the employer to choose the factual
playing field.18 5 Justice Souter discarded contrary interpretations by rea-
soning that it did not make sense to require the employer to set forth
"clear and reasonably specific" reasons if the factfinder is permitted to rely
on a reason "not clearly articulated, or on one not articulated at all" in the
record.18 6 The dissent ultimately concluded, in light of the purpose of
choosing the factual playing field, that once the employer makes this
choice, "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.'1 8 7 This
179. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
180. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)). The dissent also criticized the
Court's decision as one that "promises to be unfair and unworkable ...... Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2759-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2760 n.7 (Souter,J., dissenting). Specifically, Souter analyzed the
Burdine language that states: "IT]he plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (emphasis
added).
183. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 n.7 (Souter,J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2759 n.5 (Souter,J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent commented specifically
on the passage in Burdine that requires the employer "to frame the factual issue
with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. The dissent interpreted this to
mean that the employer has the right to choose the scope of the factual issues to
be resolved by the factfinder, and that the scope chosen binds the employer to
those factual issues. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (SouterJ., dissenting).
186. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (SouterJ., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
187. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
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more specific inquiry entails the plaintiff proving "by a preponderance of
the evidence that [the employer's] proffered reasons are pretextual."18 8
Concluding the analysis of the Burdine language, Justice Souter ana-
lyzed how the merging burdens of proving "pretext" and the "ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff had] been the victim of
intentional discrimination" could be satisfied. 189 Unlike the majority's re-
quirement of proof beyond "pretext-only," the dissent would allow a plain-
tiff to satisfy his or her burden by proving that the employer's motivation
was discriminatory either directly or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered reason was untrue. 190 Souter stated that the dissent's
reading of Burdine permits all of Burdine's language to be read in
harmony.19 1
Following the analysis of Burdine's language, the dissent examined
what it perceived to be the shortcomings of the majority's approach. 192
One of the dissent's objections was that the majority's approach permitted
the factfinder's inquiry to go beyond the scope of the employer's prof-
fered reasons.' 9 3 According to the dissent, the majority's approach sad-
dles the plaintiff with the burden of "disproving all other reasons
suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the record."' 9 4 Justice Souter con-
tended that the majority's interpretation rendered the evidentiary frame-
work devoid of effect by asking the factfinder to look beyond an
employer's lie and assume the conceivable existence of other reasons the
188. Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
190. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). The plaintiff can prove "pretext" or "pretext
for discrimination" "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256
(emphasis added). Further, the dissent claimed that the Court has attempted to
change the "either . . . or" emphasized in the above passage from Burdine into
"both . . . and," which is clearly not within the contemplation of the opinion.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 n.7 (Souter,J., dissenting).
191. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that ma-
jority opinion renders certain passages in Burdine At odds with other passages of
same decision).
192. Id. at 2761-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that "it re-
mains clear that today's decision stems from a flat misreading of Burdine and ig-
nores the central purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is
Iprogressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of inten-
tional discrimination."' Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
194. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent was astonished by the
Court's interpretation, which seemingly rendered the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work meaningless. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Further, as the dissent understood
the majority opinion, the majority allowed the factual inquiry to be so wide open
that it included possible reasons not even stated by the employer in the record. Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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employer might have forwarded without lying.1 95 In fact, the dissent ac-
cused the majority of essentially discarding the limitation on the scope of
the factual inquiry for the benefit of employers who give false evidence in
court.196
Next, Justice Souter contended that the majority's reliance on Aikens
was misplaced.1 9 7 The Aikens Court explicitly required the factfinder to
choose between the employer's explanation for the challenged employ-
ment decision and the plaintiffs claim of discrimination, proved either
directly or indirectly. 198 This language, in the eyes of the dissent, barred
the majority's conclusion that the factfinder could choose a third explana-
tion, never articulated by the employer, to rule against the plaintiff.1 99
Finally, the dissent stated that Congress implicitly approved the Mc-
Donnell Douglas-Burdine framework by not legislatively correcting the
framework. 200 Justice Souter noted that Congress had proven its readi-
ness to act legislatively to "correct" the Court's misinterpretations of statu-
tory schemes in the past:20 1 In this case, Congress had been aware of the
Court's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework for
nearly two decades and had not taken any action to indicate that the Court
wag mistaken in either McDonnell Douglas or Burdine.202
In sum, the dissent objected to the enhanced burden the majority
placed on the plaintiff.20 3 According to the dissent, this burden does not
afford "any opportunity, much less a full and fair one," to'demonstrate
that the nondiscriminatory explanation for an employment decision is un-
worthy of credence.2 0 4 The dissent criticized the Court's approach as one
195. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J.,'dissenting). The dissent stated that the majority
approach gave incentives to the employer to lie. Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). For example, if an employee proves a prima facie case and an employer can
offer no nondiscriminatory reason, the court must enter judgment for the em-
ployee. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Consequently, an employer not only benefits
from lying, but must lie to defend a disparate treatment action. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id. at 2765 (SouterJ., dissenting). In fact, Aikens repeated the language
of Burdine that allows a plaintiff to prove discrimination indirectly by proving the
employer's proffered reason as unworthy of credence. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983)).
198. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983) (stating that court must "decide which party's explanation of the em-
ployer's motivation it believes").
199. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 2765-66 (Souter,J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a* further discussion of instances
where Congress has legislatively corrected the Supreme Court, see infra note 225.
202. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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that would frustrate the remedial and deterrent purposes of Title VII.2 0 5
Justice Souter closed his pointed'dissent by stating: "Because4 see no rea-
son why Title VII interpretation should be driven by concern for employ-
ers who are too ashamed to be honest in court, at the expense of victims of
discrimination who do not happen to have direct evidence of discrimina-
tory intent, I respectfully dissent."20 6
C. Critical Analysis
The Hicks Court has significantly altered the litigation of employment
discrimination claims., In spite of the Supreme Court's attempt to refine a
cause of action for employment discrimination, the Court took a course
that has certainly tilted the judicial scales to the marked detriment of
employees. 207
The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework was to accommo-
date the unavailability of direct evidence of discriminatory animus to a
plaintiff-employee.2 08 The Court developed this framework as a logical
means of allowing a plaintiff to prove, discriminatory intent in situations
lacking the proverbial "smoking gun."20 9 , Further, to balance the scales,
the framework allowed employers an opportunity to frame the factual
"playing field" by giving legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenged employment decision.2 10
The Hicks decision revamps the McDonnell Douglas approach and re-
jects the "pretext-ofily" rationale.21 1 However, rather than whole-heart-
edly embracing the "pretext-plus" rationale, the Scalia-led majority
adopted a hybrid.21 2 This hybrid places a much greater burden on the
employee because a plaintiff who proves "pretext-only" does not necessarily
205. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting). This effect would come at least in
part from the uncertainties under the Court's scheme that give disincentives for
workers to sue. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter outlined the main
source of the uncertainty, facing a plaintiff under the majority's approach as the
potentially unlimited scope of admissible evidence going to the ultimate question
of consideration. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In other words, the dissent con-
tended that plaintiffs will have a disincentive to sue simply because the balance has
been tipped in favor of the employer under the majority approach. See id. (Souter,
J., dissenting) (discussing impact of Hicks decision on potential litigants).
206. Id. at 2766.
207. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 140-41. (stating that pretext-plus "unduly
handicap[s] employees by requiring 'plus' evidence" and "treats employment dis-
crimination cases as if they were some uniquely disfavored type of lawsuit that may
not be proven circumstantially"); Szteinbok, Note, supra note 5, at 1120 (asserting
that pretext-plus approach "ill meets the purpose [that] the indirect method of
proof was intended to serve").
208. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014, (1st Cir. 1979).
209. Id. For a further discussion of the lack of direct evidence of discrimina-
tion in employment discrimination 'cases, see supra notes 34-36.
210. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
211. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
212. Id.
1994] NOTE
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succeed as a matter of law, but may succeed if he or she persuades the
finder of fact on the ultimate question of unlawful discrimination.31
Although the Hicks Court was justified in holding that the ultimate ques-
tion is discrimination, prior Supreme Court decisions seem to have con-
templated that it is acceptable to equate the falsity of' an employer's
proffered reasons with proof of discriminationY'
4
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Burdine is flawed. Justice
Scalia gave an impressive and quite persuasive initial interpretation of this
framework when he artfully examined the language of Burdine.2 15 How-
ever, the Court's interpretation of Burdine's language, which allows a plain-
tiff to succeed indirectly by proving the employer's proffered reasons false,
is directly at odds with the Court's understanding of the remainder of the
Burdine language.2 16 Justice Scalia further trivialized the Burdine language
by stating that the language of such precedential cases is irrelevant be-
cause such cases are not in the form of statutes.21 7 The majority all but
ignored the provision for success via indirect means, simply dismissing it as
dictum and stating that it contradicts the rest of Burdine.2 18 In the pro-
213. Id. at 2754 (stating that "[i]t is not enough.., to disbelieve the employer;
the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimina-
tion"). If the Court had adopted "pretext-plus," it would simply have reversed the
court of appeals and reinstated the district court decision. The fact that the
Supreme Court remanded this decision is evidence that the holding adopts a hy-
brid approach.
214. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983) (interpreting McDonnell Douglas framework and repeating language of
Burdine); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (interpreting McDonnell Douglas and holding that
plaintiff may succeed by "indirectly ... showing that the employer's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence").
215. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of Burdine, see supra
notes 130-50 and accompanying text.
216. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing Burdine
provision that establishes plaintiff's success through presentation of circumstantial
or indirect evidence that proves employer's proffered reasons false). For a further
discussion of the dissent's interpretation of Burdine, see supra notes 181-91 and
accompanying text.
Burdine provided that the plaintiff's burden "now merges with the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that [he or] she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The Court held that the merging of
burdens leaves' the plaintiff with the heavy burden of proving that a discriminatory
reason motivated the employer. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752. This holding seems to
exclude the option, as expressed in the plain language of the Hicks opinion, that a
plaintiff may succeed simply by showing that the employer's proffered reasons are
false. See id. at 2760 n.6 (Souter,J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t seems to me 'more
reasonable' to interpret the 'merger' language in harmony with, rather than in
contradiction to, its immediate context in Burdine").
217. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. The Court stated: "[W]e think it generally un-
desirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of
the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code." Id. This
statement fails to recognize the importance of the interpretation of cases like Mc-
Donnell Douglas, Burdine, and Aikens as the main issue of debate surrounding the
Hicks decision.
218. Id. at 2752-53.
[Vol. 39: p. 123
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cess, the Hicks Court failed to grant the
, 
plaintiff a "full and fair opportu-
nity to prove pretext."2 19 A more persuasive means of interpreting Burdine
would be to effectuate the plain meaning of the language so that the en-
tire opinion may be read consistently.
The Hicks Court's interpretation of Aikens is similarly flawed. In hold-
ing that the ultimate factual question is discrimination, Aikens explicitly
repeated the Burdine language permitting success under a "pretext-only"
scheme. 220 The Hicks Court's assertion that the trier of fact can choose
another explanation that was never offered by the employer is contradic-
tory to the holding of the Aikens Court, which directed the lower court to
decide which party's explanation of the employer's motives it believes. 22 1
Additionally, the Hicks decision contravenes the intent of Title VII. 222
The Supreme Court, speaking about the purpose of Title VII, has stated
that "[w] hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidi-
ously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifi-
cation. '22 3 The holding in Hicks gives the employer a distinct advantage
by rejecting the "pretext-only" rationale and forcing the employee to go
beyond the proof of falsity of the defendant's proffered reasons. 22 4 This
advantage does not permit the courts to effectuate the purpose of Title VII
or to effectively break down the barriers of discrimination.
219. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. By permitting the factual inquiry to go beyond
the reasons proffered by the employer, the Court has effectively nullified the utility
of the second stage of the framework. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court thus transforms the 'employer's burden of production
from a device to provide notice and promote fairness into a misleading and poten-
tially useless ritual."). Although the second stage confirms that the employer has a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, under the Court's interpretation, this stage
fails to "progressively ... sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)).
220. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983) (reaffirming language in Burdine that permits plaintiff's success by
proof that employer's proffered reasons are pretextual through use of circumstan-
tial or indirect evidence).
221. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (SouterJ., dissenting) (stating in dissent that
"Aikens flatly bars the Court's conclusion here that the factfinder can choose a
third explanation, never offered by the employer, in ruling against the plaintiff"
(citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, .460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983))).
222: See 110 CONG. REc. 13,169 (1964) (statement by Senator Byrd of W. Va.)
(stating that "It] he avowed purpose of Title VII is to eliminate, by formal and infor-
mal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
223. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
224. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
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D. Congressional Solution Is In Order
The Court's attack on civil rights in recent years has prompted Con-
gress to correct mistaken interpretations of statutory law.225 The Court's
holding in Hicks runs contrary to the purposes of Title VII and, therefore,
warrants congressional action. Hicks alters a structure designed to aid the
employee who had a meritorious discrimination claim. Congress should
codify the "pretext-only" approach to permit a plaintiff to succeed in a
disparate treatment action when a plaintiff-employee can prove a defend-
ant-employer's proffered reasons are false. 2
26
225. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. V 1993)
(demonstrating Congress' willingness to overturn decisions of Supreme Court
where Court has misinterpreted Congress' legislative actions),. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 was a legislative prerogative that effectively overturned five Supreme Court
decisions of the 1988-89 term, each of which infringed upon civil rights. See Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (regarding the scope of employ-
ment discrimination covered' under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (concerning statute of limitations for Title
VII seniority cases); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755'(1989) (concerning finality of
consent decrees); Wards Cove Packing, Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (con-
cerning burdens of proof in disparate impact claims); Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (concerning burdens of proof in mixed-motive claims).
The motivation behind this initiative was to impede the Court's attack on civil
'rights. See Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A. Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Overview and Analysis, 8 LAB. LAW. 9, 9 (1992) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ...
overturns . . . Supreme Court decisions viewed by the civil rights community as
turning back the clock on the goal oferadicating employment discrimination.");
Leigh Anne Gilbert Hodge, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative
Response to the Supreme Court's Weakening of Civil Rights Remedies. in the Workplace, 22
CUMB. L. REv. 801, 817 (1992) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted as a
direct response to the Court's decisions limiting the enforcement of civil rights in
the employment context.").
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress, between 1978 and 1990,
adopted eight statutes that overturned Supreme Court decisions where Congress
believed the Court misread the statutes involved. Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misin-
terpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1095, 1096 (1993); see, e.g.,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (overturning
UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)); Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) (rejecting Supreme Court's holding in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980), that section 2 of Voting Rights
Act does not function to forbid election procedures with discriminatory effect).
226. This is precisely what Congress undertook in reversing Wards Cove under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
'2(k) (1). 'For a further discussion on the effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; see
supra note 225. Congress corrected the Court's misinterpretation of the proper
means of analyzing a disparate impact claim by codifying the burdens of proof and
clearly setting out the requisites involved in such a cause of action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k) (1).
It should also be noted that on July 28, 1993, Senator David Mann of Ohio
introduced legislation, H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), to reverse the Hicks
decision. This proposed bill amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
specify certain evidentiary matters relating to establishing an unlawful employment
practice based on disparate treatment. H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The text of the bill reads as follows:
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Hicks Court has seemingly turned its back on Title VII. The pur-
pose of Title VII and other civil rights legislation is not only to provide a
remedy, but also to provide a deterrent'to eradicate discriminatory con-
duct in the workplace. 227 The Hicks decision places obstacles in the path
of both of these objectives. 228
Be it e'nacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as -the "Employment Discrimination Eviden-
tiary Amendment of 1993".
SECTION 2. AMENDMENT.
Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
''(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate treatment
is established if-
"(A) the complaining party proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence a prima facie case that the respondent engaged in such prac-.
tice; and
"(B) either-
"(i) the respondent fails to produce any evidence to re-
but such case; or
"(ii) (I) the respondent* articulates, and produces evi-
dence of, one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
the conduct alleged to be the unlawful employment practice;
and
"(II) the complaining party demonstrates that each of
such reasons is not true, but a pretext for discrimination that is
the unlawful employment practice.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to specify the only mean by
which an unlawful, employment practice' based on disparate treatment
may be established.".
Id. Upon introduction, Congress referred the bill to the House Education and
Labor Committee. Bill To Reverse Hicks Introduced In House, 15 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 145, at d21 (July 30, 1993). As of the date of this publication, there has
been no further action on Senator Mann's bill.
227. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989). Title VII has
two basic purposes. The first is to "deter conduct which has been identified as
contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a whole.... The second goal of
Title VII is 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
* 228. See Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ'On Effect Of Hicks, Daily Lab.
Rep., (BNA) No. 126, at d26 (July 2, 1993) [hereinafter Matiagement]. An attorney
for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund stated that those
employers that do discriminate "are going to be less careful" as a result of the Hicks
decision. Id. Similarly, the Director of the Employment Discrimination Project at
the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights in Washington, D.C. stated that "[lhying
employers, will reap a lot'of benefits from the decision.. . . Nothing bad will hap-
pen to them if they lie. Employers that discriminate might decide to take the gam-
ble." Id.
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Another major hurdle put in place by Hicks will be the plaintiff's diffi-
culty in defeating a motion for summary judgment.2 29 Presumably, under
the Court's decision in Hicks, a question of fact arises if the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case and later proves the employer's proffered reason
false. 230 However, the factfinder's role in federal employment-discrimina-
tion cases has been eroded.23 1 Further, pretrial determinations that were
formerly reserved to the factfinder at trial are being made.by judges, re-
sulting in the increased use of summary judgment.2 s 2 Today, courts are
not reluctant to grant summary judgment to a defendant in a civil rights
case, even when questions of motive,,intent and credibility exist.23 3 The
Hicks decision and its heightened evidentiary burden will increase the use
of summary judgment in cases and "deny employment discrimination
plaintiffs their 'day in court' historically promised by the American model
of litigation. 23 4
Civil rights advocacy groups are calling the Hicks decision a huge step
backwards in the civil rights arena.2 3 5 From the plaintiff's. perspective, this
decision provides a huge disincentive to spend the time, money and effort
229. See generally McGinley, supra note 5 (discussing widespread use of sum-
mary judgment in civil rights cases).
230. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (stating "the factfinder's disbelief of the rea-
sons put forward by the plaintiff... may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination" (emphasis added)).
231. McGinley, supra note 5, at 206.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 207 (discussing impact of infamous "trilogy" of summary judg-
ment cases-Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)-that made it significantly easier for defendants of
employment discrimination claims to obtain summary judgment); see, e.g., Shager
v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that workload pressures
on trial courts make appellate courts extremely hesitant to overrule grant of sum-
mary judgment by lower courts "merely because a rational factfinder could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical
matter"); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1068 (6th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "given the demands now being made on the time of most district
courts, it seems to me that a full-scale trial in a case as lopsided as this one would
probably be a misallocation of judicial resources"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
234. McGinley, supra note 5, at 207; see, e.g., Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of
Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 514 (6th Cir. 1991) (summary judgment reversed on appeal
because lower court drew inferences in defendant's favor and made credibility de-
termination); Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1367 (7th Cir.
1988) (court assessed witness credibility and drew inferences in defendant's favor
in decision).
235. See, e.g., Management, supra note 228, at d26 (noting that attorney for
NAACP stated "[w]e think the decision is a blow to effective civil rights enforce-
ment"); David G. Savage, Justices Rule Fired Workers Must Prove Bias, L.A. TIMES, June
26, 1993, at Al (noting that director of women's rights project for American Civil
Liberties Union stated "[t] his is going to make it next to impossible for discrimina-
tion complainants to win").
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to litigate a claim for discrimination. 2 6 Hicks makes it much more diffi-
cult for a plaintiff-employee to prove a meritorious claim in the absence of
the elusive "smoking gun."2 37 Further, Hicks gives a defendant-employer
an incentive to lie and keep the "true" reason for an employment decision,
if it is in fact discriminatory, either far from the record or at least as ob-
scured in the record as possible.2 38
Other commentators and practitioners hail the Hicks decision as a
step in the right direction. 23 9 In addition to proving that the employer
has lied, the plaintiff-employee must now bear the burden of proving dis-
criminatory intent.2 40 Further, employers may now openly, yet reasonably,
criticize minority employees without fear of instigating a lawsuit.24
1
In terms of other practical effects, the Hicks decision may reduce the
federal court caseload in all areas of employment discrimination.2 4 2 How-
236. See, Vass, supra note 14, at 15A (stating that impact of this decision, as
result of evidentiary difficulties, may be that "victims of bias who have provable
cases will give up without trying").
237. See Max Boot, High Court Ruling Makes Proving Racial Bias Harder, CHRIS-
TIAN ScI. MONITOR, June 28, 1993, at 7. Thomas Henderson of the Lawyer's Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law states that "[t]he ruling will affect an
extraordinary number of cases - thousands and thousands..... It makes it much
harder for plaintiffs to prove employment discrimination." Id.; see St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that Court has "substitut[ed] a scheme of proof for disparate-treatment actions that
promises to be unfair and unworkable").
238. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762-64 (Souter,J., dissenting) (discussing effects
of Hicks decision on practical choices and incentives for defendant in an employ-
ment discrimination suit under McDonnell Douglas framework).
239. See Savage, supra note 235, at Al (noting that attorney from U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce stated that "[i] t is a terrific decision and it will have an important
impact"). Mark Levin, director of the Landmark Legal Foundation, sees a positive
impact coming from the Hicks decision, stating that "[w]hat this case will do is de-
crease the number of frivolous claims because now they'll be put to the test."
Boot, supra note 237, at 7.
240. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that under
majority's scheme plaintiffs will be "saddled with.., the amorphous requirement
of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find
lurking in the record"); see Savage, supra note 235, at Al (stating that "juries will be
instructed to consider all the evidence and to remember that the plaintiff must
prove he or she was fired for illegal reasons").
241. See Savage, supra note 235, at Al (noting that attorney for U.S. Chamber
of Commerce stated that "[i]n many past cases, employers were reluctant to criti-
cize a 'problem employee' and they lost discrimination cases because their expla-
nations were judged not to be the 'true-reasons'").
242. See Lanctot, supra note 5, at 69 ("Some 'pretext-plus' opinions have ex-
plicitly admitted that imposing this additional evidentiary burden on plaintiffs is
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to reduce the number of employment dis-
crimination cases tried in the federal courts."). Judge Posner of the Seventh Cir-
cuit opined that the "workload crisis of the federal courts, and realization that
Title VII is ... used by plaintiffs as a substitute for principles ofjob protection that
do not yet exist in American law, have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts
to withstand defendants' motions for summary judgment." Palucki v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989). In addition, there are alternative
means of reducing the federal court caseload while maintaining the efficacy of civil
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ever, Hicks has the potential! to promote longer trials and more pretrial
discovery, which could more. than offset the lighter caseload and actually
increase the burden on the judiciary. 24 3 Further, the potential effects on
Title VII litigation could increase expenses and cause delays - conse-
quences that adversely affect both plaintiffs and defendants. 244
The Hicks decision is another example of the Supreme Court's con-
servative activism continuing its chokehold on civil rights. 245 In light of
Congress' previous willingness to step in and "re-legislate" what it consid-
ers misinterpretations of statutory schemes, it will only be a matter of time
before this issue returns to Congress' legislative agenda.
Louis M. Rappaport
rights, including alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and other settlement tech-
niques. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association In
Support of Respondent at 29-30, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993) (No. 92-602).
243. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter,J., dissenting).
244. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
245. See Herman Schwartz, Whose Center Holds? Court's Conservative Activists
Continue to Hold Sway, CONN. L. TRaI., Aug. 2, 1993, at 10 (discussing present
Court's judicial activism in area of civil rights). Supreme Court decisions with this
tenor towards civil rights have motivated Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See Herman Schwartz, The Reagan-Bush Legacy, TEx. LAw., Aug. 2, 1993, at S-
6.
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